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CHAPTER I ; INTRODUCTION 
Each of the fifty states has at least one activities or 
athletic association to regulate the interscholastic activi­
ties of the schools within the state (1, p. 7). The state 
athletic associations were established to organize, control 
and set standards for the competitive activities between 
schools. Frequently, legal challenges to the rules and 
standards of the state athletic associations are made by the 
parents or legal guardians of the students to whom the rules 
and standards apply. 
Newspaper headlines and journal headings such as (2, 3): 
(1) "Girl hassled; quits boys team"; and (2) "Another Ath­
letic Association Rule Bites the Dust" have increasingly caught 
the attention of the public as well as school board members, 
school administrators, and state athletic association officials. 
Most frequently, these headlines signaled the beginning of 
hearings and litigation to determine the eligibility of a 
specific student in an athletic activity sponsored by a local 
school system or to challenge athletic association regulations 
that prohibit some form of student participation. 
In the December, 1971, publication of the National Organi­
zation on Legal Problems of Education, the editor acknowledges 
that a new area of litigation may be forming which involves 
the question of whether state athletic association rules or 
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actions discriminate against certain individuals or school 
districts (4). The number of existing suits within the United 
States against state athletic associations as well as the 
numerous articles in newspapers citing the attempt of girls 
to participate on varsity athletic teams indicates a growing 
challenge to association rules (4). 
The purpose of this study is to present and examine court 
decisions of record since 1970 that directly relate to the 
authority and regulatory function of state athletic associa­
tions in the United States. Specifically, court challenges 
dealing with eligibility, the right to participate in athletic 
contests, the denial of due process and equal protection 
afforded by various amendments to the United States Constitu­
tion, and discrimination on the basis of sex and/or marriage 
will be investigated for the principles of law established by 
the courts. An analysis of these court decisions is intended 
to suggest eligibility guidelines to those officials formu­
lating public school athletic policies and rtiles. 
This chapter relates the nature of the problem and the 
need for the study. The remainder of the chapter includes 
delimitations, sources of data, terminology, and the order in 
which the study is presented. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Many court challenges to state athletic associations over 
the past several years have been directed at their specific 
rules regulating the eligibility of students. Issues have 
arisen regarding: (1) the equality of athletic participation 
offered girls as compared to boys; (2) whether athletic 
participation is on an equal basis with basic education; and 
(3) whether due process was extended to athletic participants 
when their behavior warranted disciplinary action. The problem 
is therefore, to determine: 
1. Whether athletic participation in a public school 
is a right or a privilege of students. 
2. The legality of state athletic associations to 
establish eligibility requirements for student 
participation. 
3. The status of state athletic associations' policies 
which classify student participation on the basis 
of marriage and/or sex. 
4. How the intent of the due process clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States can be applied within the rules 
and regulations of the state athletic associations. 
5. How the intent of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
can be applied within the rules and regulations of the 
state athletic associations. 
Need for the Study 
Since 1970, there has been a growing tendency for the 
courts to review state athletic association rules and rulings 
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in terms of constitutional guarantees and nondiscrimination 
on the basis of marriage and/or sex. This consideration has 
been afforded individuals by the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
more recently. Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972. 
The application of the Constitutional principles by the courts 
warrants the creation of new awarenesses among officials con­
cerned with the enactment and enforcement of athletic eligi­
bility rules and policies. 
The literature reviewed on this subject indicated a lack 
of any comprehensive study of court cases as did the present 
study. A review of Dissertation Abstracts, a publication 
listing research of the United States Office of Education, 
indicated no record of the study of the problem prior to this 
study. A review of the Bibliography or School Law published 
by the National Organization on Legal Problems of Education 
did list a doctoral dissertation by Eugene Albo in 1971 
entitled "The Legal Status of State High School Activities 
Associations in the Fifty States." Upon further investigation, 
this dissertation was found to focus on the historical develop­
ment of activity associations, and it offered a comprehensive 
study of court cases and state statutes bearing on the legal 
status of state high school activities associations. In corre­
spondence with Dr. M. Chester Nolte, professor in charge of 
Eugene Albo's dissertation at Denver University and President 
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of the National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
he advised (see Appendix A); 
. . .  I  a m  c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  
legal status of state high school activities 
association needs up-dating since Gene Albo 
did his dissertation in 1971. 
At that time, no one thought anything of girls 
competing in boys' sports, nor of the other 
implications of the use of the constitutional 
guarantee as a lever in such voluntary 
organizational operations. . . I therefore am 
convinced as I said above that the study needs 
to be updated, and it will read in a very 
significant way from what Albo found in his 
study in 1971. 
. . . the new thing which has come to pass 
since 1971 is the introduction of sex problems 
and in the lack of due process of law in 
declaring athletics ineligible for various 
impermissible reasons. 
This study is intended to provide a comprehensive review 
of current court opinion relating to athletic eligibility 
which should prove useful to officials of state athletic 
associations, departments of public instruction, and public 
secondary schools. Attorneys and members of judicial offices 
may also find the information useful when involved in litiga­
tion proceedings or providing counsel. 
Delimitation of the Study 
Litigation in state and federal courts reviews many dif­
ferent types of involvement of state activity associations. 
This study is limited to the following: 
6 
1. Court cases involving public high school 
athletic associations. 
2. Court cases within the United States whose 
principles affect state athletic associations. 
3. Court cases since 1970 or those before 1970 
that still stand as precedent setting or 
leading cases. 
4. Court cases which only address the question 
of whether athletic participation in a public 
school is a right or a privilege of students. 
5. Court cases which only rule on the eligibility 
policies of athletic associations. 
6. Court cases which only involve the question 
of discrimination on the basis of marriage and/ 
or sex in athletics. 
7. Court cases ruling on the policies of athletic 
associations which involve the due process and 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The foregoing list is intended to confine this investi­
gation to a workable, researchàblè body of material. However, 
it is recognized that there is overlap and linkage between and 
among the various delimiting statements above. 
Procedures and Techniques Used in this Study 
The research referred to in this dissertation is almost 
entirely limited to primary source data. These data consisted 
of: (1) the American Digest System and its Descriptive Word 
Index; (2) the National Reporter System; (3) the American Law 
Reports; (4) the Shepard Citation to Court Cases; (5) the 
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Corpus Juris Secundum; and (6) the American Jurisprudence. 
Court cases reviewed for this study were decisions rendered 
during the period from 1970 into 1976. The volumes of the 
National Reporter System contain complete cases from all state 
and federal courts within the United States. 
Secondary sources of information included: (1) disserta­
tions; (2) publications from the National Organization on 
Legal Problems in Education; (3) amicus curiae briefs and 
other legal briefs from the National Federation of State High 
School Athletic Associations; (4) legal briefs from the Iowa 
High School Athletic Association; and (5) other publications 
offering commentary regarding the law and athletics. Research 
considered from these sources was conducted since 1970. 
The basic legal research procedure used for the briefing 
of cases was decided after review of a reference to legal 
research written by Remmlein and Rezney (5, p. 49). The basic 
approach to case briefing was determined by this writer to 
consist of obtaining four major sources of information from 
each case: (1) essential facts, (2) major issue(s), (3) de­
cision, and (4) reasons supporting the decision. An example 
of a brief prepared from the case of Hunger v. Iowa High 
School Athletic Association (6) is presented. 
Facts: 1. The Iowa High School Athletic Association 
adopted in 1968 the Good Conduct Rule and 
its interpretation which included in it 
the "beer rule." 
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2. The "beer rule" declared an athletic 
participant ineligible for six weeks of 
interscholastic competition if he possessed, 
consumed or transported alcoholic beverages, 
admitted to possession or consumption of 
same, or was a passenger in a vehicle con­
taining alcoholic beverages and/or 
dangerous drugs. 
3. The appellant's son was arrested with three 
other minors who were in possession of beer 
while traveling in an automobile. The 
appellant's son pleaded not guilty and the 
charges were dropped. After reporting the 
incident to the school officials and ex­
plaining that he had knowledge of the beer 
in the car, the Waverly Shell Rock Community 
School officials declared the appellant's 
son ineligible. 
4. The appellant brought suit to enjoin 
enforcement of the rule. 
5. The trial court upheld the rule, the appel­
lant appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court of Iowa. 
Issues: Does the Iowa High School Athletic Association have 
authority to promulgate the rule in question? 
Is the rule valid on its merits? 
Decision; Reversed. 
Reasons: 1. The State Board must submit all general ap­
plication rules to the Attorney General and 
then to the Legislative Departmental Rules 
Committee for a prescribed procedure as 
provided in Chapter 17A of the 1971 Code. 
This, in fact, had not been done and there­
fore, the rule was an Iowa High School 
Athletic Association rule and not a rule of 
the îvaverly Shell Rock Board of Education 
or the State Board. 
2. Neither the State Board nor the Waverly 
Shell Rock Board of Education could 
re-delegate its rule-making authority. 
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3. The rule in question is invalid since the 
Iowa High School Athletic Association does 
not have authority to promulgate it. 
4. The rule, when applied, must be so extended 
that it involves the innocent in order to 
convict the guilty and is, therefore, 
invalid as unreasonable. 
In addition to the four major sources of information ob­
tained by briefing court cases, the writer attempted to supply 
the following: 
1. Year in which case was decided. 
2. Name of plaintiff and defendant. 
The case brief presented above is in outline form to 
illustrate the main points obtained from the briefing of a 
court case. The presentation of case briefs in the following 
chapters will be in narrative form rather than outline as 
presented above. 
Definition of Terms 
A study of court cases requires an understanding of legal 
terminology. This list will facilitate a better understanding 
of the court case interpretations presented in this study. 
Action ; A proceeding in court which if completed will 
result in a judgment 
Ad litum: For the purposes of litigation 
Affirm: To uphold the judgment of a lower court 
Allegation; A statement made in the pleadings in the 
course of an action at law 
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Amicus curiae: A friend of the court. One who, not a 
party to a litigation, is permitted by the court in 
the interest of justice, to present argument in 
respect, therefore 
Appeal; A procedure by which a case is brought from a 
lower to a higher court 
Appellant; The party in a litigation that seeks to have 
a judgment in a lower court reversed in whole or in 
part 
Appellee; The party against whom an appeal is taken 
Arbitrary; Not supported by fair cause and without 
reason given 
Civil action; A legal proceeding brought to enforce a 
civil right or obtain redress for its violation 
Class suit; A case in which one or more in a numerous 
class, having a common interest in the issue, sues in 
behalf of themselves and all others of the class 
Concurring opinion; An opinion rendered separately by 
a judge concurring in the opinion of the court 
Damages ? The amount of money allowed by a court or 
compensation for the violation of a duty 
Decree ; The judgment of a court of equity 
Defendant; A person who is being sued in a civil action 
Defense: In the law of procedure, an affirmative setting 
up of facts in answer to a complaint 
De minimis ; The law does not care for or take notice of; 
the law does not concern itself about trifles 
Demurrer ; Allegation by one party that other party's 
allegations may be true but, even so, are not of such 
legal consequence as to justify proceeding with the 
case 
Dictum; A statement in the opinion of a court supporting 
its judgment 
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Dismissed for want of equity : Case dismissed because the 
allegations in the complaint have been found untrue, 
or because they are insufficient to entitle 
complainant to the relief sought 
Dissenting opinion; The opinion given by a justice of 
an appellate court, indicating his reasons for 
disagreeing with the result reached by the majority 
Discrimination : The making of improper distinctions 
between persons or classes 
Due process ; The exercise of the powers of government 
in such a way as to protect individual rights 
Enjoin; To issue an injunction 
Estop; To prevent 
Injunction; A judgment or decree of a court of equity, 
ordering a person to refrain from doing a 
comtemplated act or from continuing to do it 
Invalid; Without binding force, not valid 
Majority opinion; The statement of reasons for the views 
of the ma]ority of the members of the bench in a 
decision in which some of them disagree 
Mand^us : We command. A prerogative writ issued by a 
higher court directed to some official carrying on 
official functions, commanding the performance of a 
public duty 
Petition; Written application or prayer to the court for 
the redress of a wrong or the grant of a privilege 
Plaintiff; The person who brings an action at law 
Promulgate : To make known by open declaration or 
official proclamation 
Restrain: To prohibit from action: to enjoin 
Stare decisis; To stand by the decided things and not 
disturb things at rest 
Writ of certiorari ; A writ emanating from a higher court 
requiring the record of a case in the court below to 
be sent up to itself for re-determination 
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Writ of error; A writ used to review the judgment of an 
inferior court, directing that the record be sent up 
for review as to error of law 
Organization of the Study 
The study is organized into six chapters related to the 
following topics: 
Chapter I Introduction 
Chapter II Athletic Participation 
Chapter III Athletic Eligibility 
Chapter IV Due Process in Athletics 
Chapter V Equal Protection in Athletics 
Chapter VI Summary and Recommendations 
After the introductory chapter, each succeeding chapter 
deals with the problems stated in Chapter I. The last chapter 
contains a summary of the study and recommended guidelines for 
public school officials and state athletic associations to use 
in establishing eligibility rules for interscholastic competi­
tion. 
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CHAPTER II: ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the common law 
status of athletic participation in the public schools. The 
specific objective of the review is to determine whether ath­
letic participation in a public school is a right or a 
privilege of students. The sources of data for the develop­
ment of this chapter are exclusively court decisions. 
The question of athletic participation being a right or a 
privilege is frequently raised in litigation proceedings. When 
eligibility rules of a state athletic association are the 
subject of a litigation, the plaintiff frequently alleges that 
athletic participation is a property right guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the United States. The state athletic associa­
tions, in their answer, frequently contend that athletic 
participation is a privilege and not a protected property 
right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. 
These two positions are reviewed to determine the general com­
mon law status of athletic participation in the public schools. 
Right or Privilege 
In the 1970 case of Mitchell v. Louisiana High School 
Athletic Association (7), the plaintiffs-appellees gained an 
injunction preventing the athletic association from enforcing 
an eligibility rule. The rule caused any student to forfeit 
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his fourth year of high school eligibility if the student re­
peated any grade after completion of fifth grade based on his 
decision rather than that of the school. The district court 
enjoined the association from enforcing the rule. The 
appellants appealed to the United States 5th Circuit Court of 
Appeals where the court vacated and remanded with directions 
the earlier decision of the trial court. 
The court, in acknowledging the right of the athletic 
association to enforce rules concerning the eligibility of high 
school students, reasoned (7, p. 1158); (1) the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not insulate a citizen 
from every injury at the hands of the state; (2) only those 
rights, privileges and immunities that are secured by the 
Constitution of the United States or some Act of Congress are 
within the protection of the federal courts; (3) the rights, 
privileges and immunities not derived from the federal constitu­
tion or secured thereby, are left exclusively to the protection 
of the states; (4) the privilege of participating in inter-
scholastic athletics is outside the protection of due process; 
and (5) the association eligibility rule was neither suspect 
nor an encroachment on a fundamental right, but rather it was 
grounded in, and reasonably related to, a legitimate state 
interest. 
In a 1970 Florida case. Paschal v. Perdue (8), the 
plaintiff sought, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a 
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discretionary waiver of the eligibility requirements to permit 
a transfer student to play football for the school to which he 
transferred. A violation of the Civil Rights Act was alleged 
since the transfer student was black. At issue was whether or 
not the decision not to waive the eligibility requirement was 
founded solely on the color of the player's skin. In the 
deliberations that followed, the court rendered a judgment in 
favor of the defendants. The court reasoned (8): 
Although there is no federal constitutional 
right to play football, there is a federally 
enforceable right under the equal protection 
clause not to be denied eligibility, by state 
action, to play football solely because of the 
color of the player's skin. 
* * * 
The . . . decision which precludes [plaintiff's] 
playing football does not rise to constitutional 
dimensions, absent a showing that [decision] was 
based on color. 
Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of 
proving that the minor plaintiff was denied any 
rights or privileges because of race or color, 
or that any conspiracy existed to deprive such 
plaintiff of any rights or privileges 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 
As stated in Mitchell (7), supra, the privilege of par­
ticipation in inter--cholastic athletics is outside the protec­
tion of due process and is not a right guaranteed by the 
federal constitution (8, p. 1276). 
In a class action suit in 1972, Bucha v. Illinois High 
School Association (9), the plaintiffs challenged the Illinois 
High School Association by-laws which placed limitations on 
16 
girls' athletic contests that were not applicable to those 
available to boys. The suit challenged three by-laws of the 
association: (1) rule prohibiting member schools from con­
ducting interscholastic swimming competition for girls; 
(2) rule placing restrictions on girls' athletic contests 
which were not applicable to boys' contests (no organized 
cheerleading, one dollar limitation on value of awards, and 
prohibition on overnight trips in conjunction with girls' 
contests); and (3) rule prohibiting competition between 
members of the opposite sex. 
At issue were the association's rules and whether or not 
they violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In the deliberations that followed, the court 
ruled in favor of the defendants. In so ruling, the court 
referred to the question o£ whether athletic participation is 
a right or privilege by recording these remarks (9 , p. 73): 
Of course, it is clear that participation in 
interscholastic athletics is not a right 
guaranteed by the constitution or laws of the 
United States .... But, plaintiffs have 
not asserted that they have a constitutional 
right to participate in interscholastic 
athletics. Rather, they assert the right to 
equal educational opportunity . . . and the 
r i g h t  t o  e q u a l  t r e a t m e n t  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  s e x  . . . .  
In the 1973 Minnesota case of Brenden v. Independent 
School District 742 (10), the High School League of Minnesota 
contended that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was inap­
propriate because participation in interscholastic sports is a 
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privilege and not a right. The plaintiffs-appellees, two 
female students, filed civil rights action to enjoin enforce­
ment of a rule barring females from participation with males 
in high school interscholastic activities. The female students 
contended that they were denied participation in the non-
contact sports of tennis, cross-country, skiing, and running 
since teams existed for males but not for females within the 
school. The basic issue of the suit was whether or not an 
association could enforce a rule prohibiting the participation 
of females on male teams in noncontact sports when no such 
corresponding teams for females were provided. 
The United States 8th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower court's verdict. In the decision handed down, the 
court disagreed with the high school league. The court saw 
the plaintiffs being denied the benefits of activities pro­
vided by the state for male students, a denial of equal pro­
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and not whether the 
plaintiffs have an absolute right to participate in inter­
scholastic athletics. Since the question of constitutional 
rights was the issue, the court referred to the 1971 Supreme 
Court decision rendered in the case of Graham v. Richardson, 
91 S.Ct. 1848 (10, p. 1297); 
The Supreme Court has rejected 'the concept 
that constitutional rights turn upon whether 
a governmental benefit is characterized as a 
'right' or as a 'privilege'. . . '. 
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In a similar suit in 1974, Gilpin v. Kansas State High 
School Activities Ass'n, Inc. (11), a female student claimed 
deprivation of equal protection provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment when an association rule prevented plaintiff from 
participating in a cross-country competition solely on the 
basis of her sex. The school did not provide a separate 
girls' cross-country team. The rule which was the issue in 
the case prevented boys and girls from being members of the 
same athletic teams in interscholastic contests. The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff. 
In arguing the case, the association reasoned (11, 
p. 1240): 
. . . IP]articipation in interscholastic 
competition is a privilege, rather than a 
right, and . . . relief under the Civil 
Rights Act is accordingly inappropriate. 
The court, agreeing with the association's contention, but 
disagreeing with its conclusion, stated (11, p. 1240): 
Although the Court fully agrees with the 
Association's contention that participation 
in interscholastic sports is not a 
fundamental right, it cannot accept the 
conclusion which the Association draws from 
that fact. 
Vested Property Right 
Frequently, when the eligibility rules of an athletic 
association prevent a student from participating in athletic 
contests, the student, through court action, has sought a 
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judgment against the athletic association involved, alleging 
loss of an opportunity to acquire a future property. Such a 
suit was filed in Taylor v. Alabama High School Athletic 
Association (12) in 1972. The plaintiffs, basketball players 
in an Alabama high school, brought suit against the Alabama 
High School Athletic Association to seek relief from sanctions 
imposed upon their high school. The sanctions prevented their 
high school from hosting or participating in an invitational 
basketball tournament for a period of one year. The plain­
tiffs contended that the privilege of participating in inter-
scholastic athletics and the chance provided by participation 
to acquire a college scholarship were "property rights" pro­
tected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In dismissing the suit for absence of a federal question, 
the court in its mémorandum opinion stated (12; p: 57)? 
. . . [T]he privilege of participating in 
interscholastic athletics is not a property 
right and is, therefore, outside of the 
protection of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
* * * 
The Supreme Court of Alabama [citing Scott 
V. Kilpatrick, 237 So. 2d 652] has held that 
a plaintiff's possibility ofacquiring an 
athletic scholarship if allowed to display his 
a t h l e t i c  p r o w e s s  i s  n o  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t  . . .  :  
'We hold that the speculative possibility of 
the complainant acquiring a football scholar­
ship as shown under the facts presented furnishes 
no basis for a finding that the complainant was 
deprived of any property right.' 
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In the case of Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School District 
(13) concluded in 1975, the court decided on whether the con­
stitutional protection afforded to public school students by 
the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the extracurricular 
activity of interscholastic athletics. The plaintiff, a fif­
teen year old student who had transferred to Cumberland Valley 
School District from a neighboring district, sought a permanent 
injunction to enjoin enforcement of a rule of the Pennsylvania 
Interscholastic Athletic Association. The specific rule from 
which relief was sought automatically barred from inter­
scholastic competition for one school year any student who 
transferred from one school district to another, but who did 
not reside in the transferee's district with a parent or 
guardian. The plaintiff did not disagree with the reasoning 
behind the rule, but argued that the automatic ineligibility 
rule acts as an unrebuttable prescription, a violation of his 
equal protection and due process rights guaranteed under the 
United States Constitution. The issue before the court was 
the question of whether or not the association rule denied due 
process and equal protection as afforded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. 
In deciding for the defendant, the court dismissed the 
case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. In its opinion, 
the court concluded (13, p. 362); 
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. . . iTjhere exists no constitutionally 
protected property interest in competing for 
a place on a high school athletic team. To 
hold otherwise would too greatly strain the 
concept of property. 
* * * 
Even were this court to find a property interest 
in interscholastic athletics, it would clearly 
be a de minimis one. As noted, the plaintiff 
has access to physical exercise, athletic 
instruction and even competition (with athletes 
from his own school). He is merely barred from 
competing as a member of one high school team 
against athletes from other schools for one 
year. 
To further support this decision, the court quoted this 
ruling from the 1970 decision of Mitchell (7) supra, (13, 
p. 361): 
'[T]he due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment does- not insulate a citizen from 
every injury at the hands of the state. 'Only 
those rights, privileges and immunities that 
arc secured by the Constitution of the United 
States or some Act of Congress are within the 
protection of the federal courts. Rights, 
privileges and immunities not derived from 
the Federal Constitution or secured thereby 
are left exclusively to the protection of the 
states.' The privilege of participating in 
interscholastic athletics must be deemed to fall 
in the latter category and outside the protec­
tion of due process.' 
Summary 
The question of whether athletic participation is a 
property right or a privilege guaranteed by the Constitution 
was presented through an examination of court cases occurring 
from 1970 into 1976. Court cases representing the plaintiff's 
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contention that athletic participation is a property right 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States were pre­
sented. In other cases presented, the defendant's argument 
was that student participation in high school interscholastic 
athletics is a privilege and not a right guaranteed by the 
constitution and laws of the United States. An analysis of 
the case decisions presented in this chapter would indicate 
that the following legal principles should be acknowledged by 
those officials establishing eligibility rules for inter­
scholastic competition with public high schools: 
1. Students in public high schools do not have 
an inherent right to participate in inter­
scholastic athletics. 
2. Students within public high schools do not 
have a vested property right in interscholastic 
athletics. 
5. Student participation in interscholastic 
athletics is a privilege falling outside the 
protection of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
4. The legal principle that participation in 
interscholastic competition is a privilege 
rather than a right cannot be provided as a 
basis for excluding females from male non-
contact sports when no provision allows for 
the separate maintenance of the same non-
contact Sports for females. To do otherwise 
is a violation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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CHAPTER III: ATHLETIC ELIGIBILITY 
This chapter is a review of litigation that has been 
directed at various state high school athletic association 
eligibility rules regulating the participation of high school 
students in interscholastic competition. The general objec­
tive of state athletic association eligibility rules was 
determined in a study by Albo in which he stated (1, p. 70): 
The rules had been designed to equalize 
competition by holding participants to the 
same standards regarding their age, amateur 
standing, scholastic requirements, residence 
and transfer requirements, attendance, out­
side participation, and other special 
eligibility requirements. 
Whenever an interscholastic high school participant vio­
lates or fails to meet a respective eligibility rule, the 
association^ through its member high school, invokes disci­
plinary action against the participant. The disciplinary 
action follows the by-laws of the association to which the 
member high school belongs. The disciplinary action usually 
results in declaring the participant ineligible from further 
competition for a specified period of time. Litigation fre­
quently results contending that the association's action; 
(1) violates the participant's individual rights; (2) was un­
reasonable, arbitrary, and capricious; or (3) was based upon 
a rule which is unreasonable. 
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Eligibility Litigation 
The reasonableness and validity of a school rule is a 
subject of law for the courts. Generally, a rule which is 
adopted for the discipline and management of some phase of the 
operation of a school program is not disturbed by courts un­
less the rule can be shown to be unreasonable. According to 
American Law as restated in 79 Corpus Juris Secundum §496 
(14, p. 444) ; 
A rule or regulation in regard to discipline 
and management of a public school, whether 
adopted by the teacher or by the school board, 
must be reasonable in itself, but as long as 
it is within reason it will not be disturbed. 
A presumption exists in favor of the reason­
ableness and propriety of a rule adopted by 
school authorities under statutory authority; 
and this presumption is not affected by the 
consideration of possible abuses of the rule 
where it may be construed as reasonably 
desxgricd for a legitimate purpcss. Whsthsr a 
rule or regulation is reasonable and valid is 
a question of law for the court. 
As early as 1938 in Oklahoma, a court decision, frequently 
cited in athletic eligibility cases today, involved a challenge 
to a state high school activities association's eligibility 
rule. In the case of Morrison v. Roberts (15), the 
plaintiffs-appellees, Roberts and fellow members of the Holden-
ville High School football team, were declared ineligible for 
athletic participation for a period of one year. The players 
had violated the amateur and awards rule by each receiving a 
gold football charm from a group of fans within their community. 
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A violation of the rule automatically declared a player in­
eligible for a period of one year. 
Through trial court action, the plaintiffs-appellees had 
challenged the association's action as being arbitrary, 
erroneous, and subject to review. The court had awarded the 
plaintiff am injunction preventing the association from en­
forcing its eligibility rule, but upon review of the trial 
court's decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the 
decision and dismissed the case. The court supported the 
right of the association to declare a student ineligible when 
the student's actions violate an association rule. In so 
doing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated one of the first 
decisions regarding a state athletic association's regulatory 
power. This decision has since come to be one of the most 
quoted common law principles in similar cases involving 
eligibility rules (15, p. 1024): 
If it be said that the rule involved and the 
fixed penalty is arbitrary, that may be so. 
And one unskilled in such matters might see 
no logic in or necessity for that rule, or 
might think it should be or might as well be 
otherwise. The same might be said also as to 
th# arbitrary rule that "three strikes" retires 
the batter, not more nor less; or the rule 
that a "touchdown" counts six points, while 
the "point after touchdown" counts only one 
pointj or the rule that the "base runner" 
advances if the pitcher makes a "balk"; and 
the same might be said of many of the other 
rules of the association above referred to. 
Many of those rules are in fact arbitrary 
rules. They might provide otherwise or might 
not be there at all. But so long as the 
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member schools want them they are entitled 
to have them and to have them construed and 
enforced by final action of the Board of 
Control as long as they want that. 
It is often thought and sometimes vociferously 
stated that athletic officials, including 
referees and umpires, have grievously erred 
in decisions and rulings. But when adopted 
rules, acquiesced in by all, give them the 
power of final decision, such decisions should 
not ordinarily be reviewed by the courts and 
vacated by the writ of mandamus. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that in 
various athletic organizations, and in various 
athletic contests, certain officials are 
clothed with final authority to construe rules 
and enforce penalties, and to suspend players 
from the game in progress, or for a definite 
period of time, or to forfeit the game or the 
match to one participant or the other. Fre­
quently such rule enforcements work more or 
less grievous injury to one directly affected 
thereby, without in any sense giving him a 
right to correct or change the result by court 
action such as this. The courts generally 
should leave the final authority in the athletic 
official or board, with whom that authority is 
placed by those who had authority to make the 
rules and authorize the method of application 
and enforcement. 
An eligibility transfer rule was the subject of litiga­
tion in the 1970 Alabama Supreme Court case of Scott v. 
Kilpatrick (16). The complainant, Kilpatrick, had been 
declared ineligible for participation in football due to 
failure on his part to meet residency requirements during the 
prior semester. This ineligibility resulted when the 
complainant enrolled in a neighboring school during the spring 
semester without a subsequent move being made to that district 
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by his parents. The next fall the complainant re-enrolled in 
his former school district in which his parents resided. The 
eligibility rule of the Alabama High School Athletic Associa­
tion that the complainant violated stated (16, p. 654); 
'A pupil will be ineligible for one year if he 
transfers to a school where his parents do not 
reside. If a boy is living at home and com­
muting to attend a school that does not serve 
the area in which he lives, he cannot return 
to his home school and become immediately 
eligible. It will be necessary for him to 
attend his home school for one year before 
becoming eligible.' 
The central issue was whether or not the association's 
rule could declare a student ineligible. The trial court 
enjoined the association from enforcing the rule, but upon 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, the court reversed 
the trial court's decision. In finding for the association, 
the court noted the decisions of courts in other states which 
had considered similar situations and had virtually been of 
the same conclusion. The court noted the principle developed 
in these cases as (16, p. 655): 
Participation in high school athletics is 
an extracurricula activity subject to regu­
lations as to eligibility. Engaging in these 
activities is a privilege which may be claimed 
only in accordance with the standards set up 
for participation. 
In the 1370 Minnesota ease of Brown v. Wells (17), the 
plaintiff brought suit to nullify and enjoin the Minnesota 
High School League's eligibility rules pertaining to high 
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school hockey. The League's hockey rules for eligibility 
specifically stated that a student may not (1) participate on 
an independent hockey team; (2) participate in any hockey game, 
practice, or other hockey activities between the close of one 
season and the start of the next; and (3) attend a hockey 
school, camp, or clinic, unless sanctioned by the League's 
Board of Control (17, p. 709). The plaintiff violated the 
eligibility rule by attending a summer camp not sanctioned by 
the League, but the plaintiff contended that the rules were 
arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and "unlawfully deny 
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities" to student 
athletes (17, p. 709). 
The court declared the eligibility rule invalid, but the 
Minnesota High School League appealed the decision. The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the lower court and noted 
its reasons as follows (17, p. 711); 
'In the alternative, the undersigned takes the 
view that [plaintiff-appellee] has a constitu­
tionally protected right to participate in 
hockey competition at Roosevelt High School 
and to compete for team membership so long as 
he violates no law and no rules having a 
proper school related purpose or calculated 
to protect and further the welfare of the 
school.' 
* * * 
While the views expressed by the trial court 
are not without logic and reason, we must be 
controlled by well-established authority which 
recognizes that it is the duty of courts, 
regardless of personal views or individual 
philosophies, to uphold regulations adopted by 
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administrative authorities unless those regu­
lations are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Any other approach would result in confusion 
detrimental to the management, progress, and 
efficient operation of our public school system. 
Also in 1970, two United States District Court cases, 
Mitchell V. Louisiana High School Athletic Association (7), 
supra, and Paschal v. Perdue (8), supra, heard arguments made 
by the plaintiffs challenging the right of state athletic 
associations to execute eligibility rules. In both cases, 
the courts decided in favor of the defendants. 
In Mitchell (7, p. 1158), supra, the court reasoned that 
the Louisiana High School Athletic Association's eligibility 
rule was : 
. . . neither inherently suspect nor an 
e n c r o a c h m e n t  o n  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  r i g h t  . . . .  
it is grounded in, and reasonally related 
to, a legitimate state interest. 
The court in Paschal (8, p. 1276), supra, reasoned that 
the eligibility rule of the state athletic association is: 
. . . designed to prevent "raids" upon 
athletic teams. Its objective is also to 
assure the effectiveness of discipline in 
preventing an athlete from summarily quiting 
a team when he dislikes an order of the 
coach or requirement regarding training. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1972 tried the case of the 
Oklahoma State School Activities Association v. Midget (18). 
The appellants sought relief from an injunction barring the 
association from interfering in any manner with a scheduled 
football game playoff. The appellee was a high school 
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football player who had been declared ineligible for violation 
of a transfer rule. Since discovery of the appellee's in­
eligibility had not occurred until after conclusion of the 
season's football games, (1) the appellee was declared in­
eligible; (2) the high school team forfeited each game in 
which the appellee participated; and because of this action, 
(3) the team forfeited its right to participate in the 
scheduled football game playoff. This action was invoked 
according to the by-laws of the association to which the 
appellee's high school was a member. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in favor of the asso­
ciation, declaring that the association had the right to dis­
cipline and regulate its membership. In citing the general 
authority of the Oklahoma State School Activities Association, 
the court recognized the position accepted by all state courts 
as stated in 6 American Jurisprudence 2d §37, page 466 (18, 
p. 178) : 
'With regard to associations, societies, and 
clubs generally, the trial or hearing before 
the tribunal or officers of the organization 
is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, and 
a court will not re-try the case upon the 
facts or determine, as a matter of its own 
judgment, whether the member should have been 
suspended or expelled, but will limit its in­
terference to certain.other grounds. In such 
cases the courts never interfere except to 
ascertain whether or not the proceeding was 
pursuant to the rules and laws of the organi­
zation, whether or not the proceeding was in 
good faith, whether or not there was anything 
in the proceeding in violation of the law of 
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the land. If it is found that the proceeding 
was had fairly, in good faith, and pursuant 
to the laws of the organization, and that 
there was nothing in it in violation of the 
law of the land, the decision is conclusive. . . .' 
The Supreme Court of Missouri in 1974 ruled on the Mis­
souri State High School Athletic Association's rule which 
declared high school students ineligible for interscholastic 
activities once they had attained the age of nineteen prior 
to September 1. In the ease of State of Missouri, ex rel, 
Missouri State High School Athletic Association v. Schoenlaub 
(19), the association sought to prohibit the circuit court 
from proceeding further in an injunction suit filed by 
plaintiffs. In deciding whether the injunction against the 
enforcement of the eligibility rule should be granted, the 
court had to decide on the reasonableness of the rule, and 
the right of the association to make such rules. In its de­
cision for the association to make the rule absolute, the court 
reasoned as in Morrison v. Roberts, (15), supra, and cited the 
similar 1963 case in Illinois of Robinson v. Illinois High 
School Association, 195 N.E. 2d 38 (19, p. 358): 
'. . . A determination of the ineligibility 
of plaintiff to play interschool basketball 
was made by those in whom the constitution, 
by-laws, and rules of the Illinois High School 
Association vested the power and duty to make 
that determination. 
'In the absence of any evidence of fraud or 
collusion, or that the defendants acted un­
reasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously, the 
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Athletic Association must be, under the 
authorities cited, permitted to enforce its 
rules and orders without interference by the 
courts.• 
The plaintiffs had alleged that the association's refusal 
to apply a hardship exception, in view of an illness which had 
held them back in school, was unreasonable and arbitrary. The 
Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument (19, p. 359): 
If an athlete of more than 19 years of age 
were permitted to participate in athletic 
contests the fact that his may be a hard­
ship case would in no manner diminish the 
dangers and other detrimental effects 
resulting from his participation. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in considering the 
reasonableness of the rule, cited the 1970 Minnesota case of 
Brown v. Wells (17), supra, as authority (19, p. 359): 
'In the final analysis, the court must deter­
mine if the board's action is so willful and 
unreasoning, without consideration of the 
facts and circumstances, and in such disregard 
of them as to be arbitrary and capricious. 
Where there is room for two opinions on the 
matter, such action is not 'arbitrary and 
capricious,* even though it may be believed 
that an erroneous conclusion has been reached.' 
There was a sound basis for the adoption of 
the rule in question and we see nothing to 
indicate that it is unreasonable, arbitrary, 
or unfair. 
Also in 1974, the Supreme Court of New York State heard 
an appeal case regarding an athletic eligibility rule in 
Murtaugh v. Nyquist (20). The petitioners, Murtaugh and 
another high school student, attempted to set aside a 
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determination prohibiting them from participating in high 
school athletics. Their suit attacked an eligibility rule 
contained in the Rules and Regulations of the Commissioner 
of Education of New York State. The particular rule declared 
a student eligible for inter-high school athletic competition 
only during eight consecutive semesters after his entry into 
ninth grade, and prior to graduation, unless sufficient evi­
dence could be shown that the student's failure to participate 
during one or more semesters was caused by illness, accident, 
or some other circumstance deemed acceptable. The petitioners 
claimed the rule was arbitrary. 
In ruling in favor of the commissioner's rule, the Supreme 
Court of New York State declared the rule valid and dismissed 
the action. The court acknowledged the purpose of the rule as 
designed to prevent "red shirting." In giving its explana­
tion of "red shirting" and the reason why the rule controlling 
the practice was not arbitrary, the court said (20, p. 596); 
"Red shirting" is a practice whereby a high 
school student is held back for one grade for 
academic reasons and does not compete in ath­
letics for that school year. The student 
then competes in his fifth year in high school, 
when he is more mature, physically developed 
and presumably more proficient. . . . the 
older "red shirted" student is competing with 
younger, less developed students - a situation 
which could lead to injuries. 
The court therefore declared (20, p. 597): 
. . . there is an obvious and reasonable 
basis for the regulation, and thus this court 
may not annul the regulation. 
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana in late 1975 rendered a 
decision on the transfer rule of the state athletic association 
in the case of Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic 
Association (21). The plaintiff, a high school student, had 
enrolled in a Catholic high school which was outside the public 
school district he had attended through eighth grade. Since 
the Catholic high school was outside the public school district 
in which he resided and had attended school previously, the 
transfer rule of the state athletic association declared him 
ineligible for one year. The association had advanced the 
rule to prevent recruiting of athletes from school district to 
school district. The plaintiff contended that the application 
of the rule was discriminatory and infringed upon the right to 
freedom of religion. 
The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff and 
issued an injunction against enforcement of the transfer rule. 
The court reasoned (21, p. 776): 
. . . [T]he transfer rule forces only those 
persons who reside outside [the public school 
district with the Catholic high school] to 
forfeit a year's athletic eligibility, while 
those who live within [that district] and wish 
to get a Catholic education ... do not 
forfeit any athletic eligibility. 
On appeal of the decision to the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals by the state association, the Court reversed the trial 
court's decision finding no denial of religious freedom nor 
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deprivation of equal protection. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
(21, p. 776): 
The court found a rational basis between the 
application of the transfer rule to the evil 
it was intended to protect against, namely, 
recruiting. Since the rule had a rational 
basis, the . . . court found no constitutional 
infirmity. 
On writ of certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
reviewed the decision of the lower court. The court recog­
nized the decision in this case to be made on the grounds of 
equal protection, not on a denial of due process. Also, the 
association's contention that athletics is a privilege and 
not a right and should thereby apply to this case, was rejected 
by the court. In citing its basis for the rejection, the court 
cited the 1971 case of Graham v. Richardson, supra, 91 S.Ct. 
1848 which stated (21, p. 777): 
. . . But this court now has rejected the 
concept that constitutional rights turn 
upon whether a governmental benefit is 
characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege'. 
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court noted (21, p. 780): 
We recognize that the application of the 
transfer rule may work a hardship on plaintiff 
and others similarly situated. However, that 
fact does not make the rule unconstitutional. 
* * * 
As long as the rule is uniformly applied and 
not arbitrary, and related rationally to a 
legitimate governmental interest, that rule 
cannot be said to violate the guarantee of 
equal protection of the law. 
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Not all court decisions involving a challenge to a state 
athletic association eligibility rule have been in favor of 
the association. One such court case decided by the Supreme 
Court of Iowa in 1972 was the case of Hunger v. Iowa High 
School Athletic Association (6), supra. At issue was the 
association's "Good Conduct Rule" and that portion referred to 
as the "beer rule." The "beer rule" declared an athletic 
participant ineligible for six weeks of interscholastic com­
petition if he possessed/ consumed or transported alcoholic 
beverages, admitted to possession or consumption of same, or 
was a passenger in a vehicle containing alcoholic beverages 
and/or dangerous drugs. The plaintiff-appellant had been 
declared ineligible because he was a passenger in a vehicle 
where alcoholic beverages were being consumed. 
The plaintiff-appellant brought suit to enjoin enforcement 
of the rule. The trial court upheld the rule, but upon appeal 
to the Supreme Court, the high court reversed the lower court 
decision. The court found that the rule in question was lack­
ing on two counts. The first count regarded the association's 
enforcement of the rule to which the court stated (6, p. 563): 
The rule before us is, in fact, a rule of the 
IHSAA and not of the [local school board] or of 
the State Board, Neither of the latter public 
bodies could re-delegate its rule-making 
authority. We hold that the rule is invalid 
for want of authority in IHSAA to promulgate it. 
The second count upon which the court ruled was the 
reasonableness of the rule. In this regard the court made this 
37 
statement (6, p. 565); 
We realize that the rule has been made broad 
in an effort to avoid problems of proving a 
connection between the student and the beer, 
but rules cannot be so extended as to sweep 
in the innocent in order to achieve in­
variable conviction of the guilty. We hold 
the rule in question is invalid as unreasonable. 
The case of Sturrup v. Mahan (22) was heard in the State 
Supreme Court of Indiana in 1974 after more than two years of 
court action. Sturrup, plaintiff-appellant in the suit, had 
been declared ineligible from interscholastic competition 
after moving from Florida to Indiana without a similar move 
being made by his parents. Once in Indiana, his brother 
became his legally recognized guardian. The move to Indiana 
was cited as necessary to remove the plaintiff from a demor­
alizing home and school environment. The plaintiff cited as 
reasons for his move: (1) the extensive use of drugs by his 
fellow classmates; (2) poor study conditions in his home; 
(3) inadequate personal accommodations in his parent's two-
bedroom house where he lived with his ten sisters; and (4) a 
need to relieve the stress felt by his mother who suffered 
from a heart condition. 
The basic issue in the suit was whether the association's 
rule designed to prevent recruiting and "sehool=jumping" had 
been applied judiciously or in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower 
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court and found that the rule's application had been arbi­
trary êmd capricious. The court noted its reason for the 
decision in this statement (22, p. 881): 
. . . the purported objective of the transferee 
eligibility rules is to prevent the use of 
undue influences and school "jumping/' but 
their practical effect is to severely limit the 
transferee eligibility in general. The rules 
as presently constituted penalize a student -
athlete who wishes to transfer for academic or 
religious reasons or for any number of other 
legitimate reasons. Surely, denying eligibility 
to such transferees in no way furthers [the 
association's] objectives. 
* * * 
. . . the [association's] decision to deny 
[plaintiff] eligibility - in the absence of 
any evidence of "undue influence" - can only 
be viewed as patently arbitrary, and capri­
cious, and must be reversed. 
Two similar court cases since 1974 were decided in the 
State of Florida against the Stats Hxgh School Activitiss 
Association. The case of Lee v. Florida High School Activities 
Association, Inc. (23) was decided in the District Court of 
Appeals in 1974. The plaintiff-appellant, a high school 
student, was declared ineligible from further athletic competi­
tion after four years had elapsed from his start in ninth 
grade. The court record showed the plaintiff attending: 
(1) ninth grade in 1969 in California; (2) until November of 
1971 in California when he moved to Florida with his family; 
(3) a Florida high school in September, 1972, after staying 
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out of school during the remainder of the 1971-72 school year 
to help support the family; (4) school in September, 1973, 
when the association declared plaintiff ineligible. The 
plaintiff was declared ineligible since the rule limits the 
eligibility of each student to four consecutive years from the 
time he enters ninth grade. In a petition presented to the 
association, the plaintiff sought to have the ineligibility 
set aside on the grounds of undue hardship. The association's 
response was a refusal to waive the ineligibility ruling 
against the plaintiff. 
The court suit contended that the association's actions 
were harsh and as enforced, denied plaintiff of due process 
in denying him the opportunity to establish his eligibility. 
The court's decision reversed and remanded with directions 
the ruling of the lower court. The court cited as its reasons 
for the decision (23, p. 638); 
. . . defendant [association] without 
establishing any uniform standards or affording 
the plaintiff an opportunity to present 
evidence, refused to declare the complainant a 
hardship case and failed to offer any reasons 
therefor. Thus, we conclude that the complaint 
on its face sufficiently alleges the harshness 
of the executive committee's action and the 
denial of due process in that it denied the 
plaintiff an opportunity to establish his 
eligibility,- by relying upon the four year 
rule which was applied arbitrarily in the 
instant action. 
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In a similar 1975 Florida District Court of Appeals case, 
the court ruled against the association's application of the 
four-year eligibility rule. In the case of the Florida High 
School Activities Association, Inc. v. Bryant (24) the 
plaintiff-appellee, Bryant, claimed he qualified as a hardship 
case and therefore, the four-year eligibility rule should not 
be invoked in an arbitrary manner, excluding him from basket­
ball during his senior year. 
The decision of the court affirmed the lower court ruling 
against the defendant. In ruling for the plaintiff, the court 
noted the case of Lee v. Florida High School Activities Asso­
ciation, Inc. (23), supra, and the fact that "red shirting," 
which the four-year eligibility rule is designed to prevent, 
was not involved. The court felt that the plaintiff's par­
ticipation in interscholastic basketball (24); 
'. . . is an important and vital part of his 
life providing an impetus to his general 
scholastic and social development and 
rehabilitation from his prior problems as a 
juvenile delinquent. It has resulted in the 
improvement of his grades, attitude, self-
confidence, discipline and maturity.' 
Summary 
A review of litigation directed at the various state 
athletic association's eligibility rules and occurring from 
1970 into 1976 was the subject of this chapter. The general 
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grounds for litigation occurring centered around challenges 
to; (1) the general authority of state athletic associations 
to regulate the eligibility of individual participants? 
(2) the association's alleged violation of an individual's 
constitutional rights; (3) an association's specific eligi­
bility rule, alleging that the rule was unreasonable, 
arbitrary, and capricious; (4) the association's application 
of the rule to a specific individual's case, alleging that the 
rule created an undue hardship in view of the facts presented; 
and (5) the association's procedural process for declaring a 
participant's ineligibility, alleging that the participant was 
denied or limited due process rights. 
From the case decisions analyzed in this chapter, certain 
legal principles tend to appear. These legal principles are 
presented for review by those officials who have within their 
responsibility the establishment of eligibility rules for in-
terscholastic competition with public high schools : 
1, Reflecting a state interest, a state athletic 
association is recognized in common law as 
having the authority to set rules and 
regulations for the supervision and control 
of the public school athletic programs within 
a state. 
2. The court will not interfere with the discre­
tion exhibited by an association, unless the 
rule or actions of the association are shown 
to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. 
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The court will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the association, but it will 
review the proceeding to establish whether 
or not the association followed its own 
guidelines for determining ineligibility. 
The court will review the proceeding followed 
by an association to determine if any events 
within the proceeding were in violation of the 
due process clause of the Constitution of the 
United States. 
The court will review the application of an 
eligibility rule to determine whether its 
basis is in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution. 
Student participation in extracurricular 
activities is deemed a privilege and, there­
fore, such participation must be in accord­
ance with the established standards of the 
association. 
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CHAPTER IV: DUE PROCESS IN ATHLETICS 
This chapter is a discussion of the implications of the 
due process clause of the Constitution of the United States as 
applied to interscholastic competition in public high schools. 
The discussion of the implications of the due process clause 
is presented through a review of its common law status. 
Various court cases occurring during the span of time from 
1970 into 1976 are the subject of the review. 
Due Process of Law 
Due process of law is defined as (25, p. 545): 
Recognition of the rule that a person shall 
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without an opportunity to be heard in defense 
o f  h i s  r i g h t  . . . .  
Its origin is historical, being older than written constitu­
tions, and having been interwoven into the common law long 
prior to the adoption of the Magna Charta (25, p. 545). 
The concept of due process of law became a guaranty to 
the people of the United States when it first became a clause 
written into the Fifth Amendment of the United States Consti­
tution. The amendment provides that (25, p. 546): 
i i : 'no person shall . . .  b e  d e p r i v e d  o f  
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.' 
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This amendment, however, was restricted and limited to the 
powers of the federal government and not to the states. As 
such, the due process clause by this amendment applies only 
to federal courts and not to state courts. 
Recognition of this basic right and with the intent to 
extend this guaranty to all people governed by state actions, 
the due process clause was written into the United States Con­
stitution for the second time. This came about in the writing 
of the Fourteenth Amendment with the inclusion of this clause 
(25, p. 548); 
. . . 'Nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.' 
This clause, in effect, placed the same limitations on the 
states as had been placed on the federal government by the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Due process in the Fourteenth Amendment is that which is 
guaranteed by the constitution and laws of a particular state. 
According to American Law as restated in 16A Corpus Juris 
Secundum §568, (25, p. 552): 
. . . what due process requires in one state 
is not necessarily due process in another, 
and the amendment does not require that process 
of law be the same in all the states or the 
same as that prescribed for the federal courts. 
The extent of application of the due process of law finds 
its principle being applied to administrative agencies, boards 
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and boards of education (25, p. 554). In fact, the due process 
of law guaranty extends to (25, p. 556): 
. . . every governmental proceeding which 
may interfere with personal or property 
rights, whether the proceeding be legislative, 
judicial, administrative, or executive. 
In Chapter II of this study, the question of whether 
athletic participation is a right or privilege was studied 
through a review of court cases occurring from 1970 into 1976. 
The court cases presented dealt with many different types of 
eligibility situations in which the athletic associations 
presented, as a part of their argument, the concept that ath­
letic participation in the public high school is a privilege 
rather than a right. 
After examining the court cases presented, it was noted 
that the associations' arguments for athletic participation 
being a privilege did at times apply and at other times did 
not apply to the basic issue before the court; but in each 
court deliberation that followed, the court acknowledged the 
fundamental concept of athletic participation in the public 
high school as constituting a privilege rather than a right. 
The prevailing opinion of the courts also indicated that the 
chance of earning a college scholarship through high school 
athletic participation was just a chance, and as such, high 
school athletic participants have no vested property interest 
or guaranty of a future property as a result of their partici­
pation. Therefore, the due process clause cannot protect an 
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individual from being deprived of the privilege as long as the 
deprivation of the privilege is not based upon an arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable decision. 
The courts have further interpreted two aspects to the 
due process of law. One literal aspect refers to procedural 
rights. Whenever a person is being deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, due process requires that a notice be served and 
an opportunity be provided for the person being denied the 
right to be heard before a fair, competent and impartial tri­
bunal having jurisdiction (25, p. 571). 
The second aspect of due process of law refers to those 
rights classified as substantive. Due process when applied 
to substantive rights is interpreted to mean (25, p. 539); 
. . . the government is without right to deprive 
a person of life, liberty, or property by an act 
that has no reasonable relation to any proper 
governmental purpose, or which is so far beyond 
the necessity of the case as to be an arbitrary 
exercise of governmental power, .... In the 
concrete, it means that in a contest involving 
these rights a person will be accorded the 
opportunity to contest the propriety of each 
step in the action sought to be taken against 
him. 
Therefore, substantive due process involves a determination 
of whether the reasons behind the actions taken against a 
person are proper and reasonable. As contrasted to sub­
stantive due process, procedural due process deals exclusively 
with the determination of whether a person has been provided 
with proper notice and the opportunity to respond to the 
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reasons given for denial of a right. 
The study of the concept of due process as presented in 
the remainder of this chapter is directed at the states' and 
federal courts' interpretations of the application of pro­
cedural and substantive due process in high school athletics. 
Those court cases involving the two interpretations of due 
process are examined and presented for analysis. 
Procedural and Substantive Due Process 
In 1970, the case of Mitchell (7), supra, was an attempt 
by the plaintiff to use the due process clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment as a shield against the enforcement of a 
state athletic association's eligibility rule. The plaintiff 
contended that the athletic association's eligibility rule 
did not provide the opportunity through procedural due process 
for the plaintiff to present a defense for the right of par­
ticipation which the application of the eligibility rule would 
deny. 
The court denied the plaintiff's contention that due 
process was violated by the actions of the athletic associa­
tion. The basic reason for the court's decision centered 
around the fact that the court did not view the plaintiff's 
denial to participate in athletic contests as a fundamental 
right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United 
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States. Therefore, the court was of the opinion that athletic 
participation was outside the protection of due process in the 
federal courts. 
An argument was made by plaintiff respondents in the 1972 
case of Bruce v. South Carolina High School League (26) that 
enforcement of a transfer rule deprived plaintiffs of due 
process and equal protection by arbitrarily depriving them of 
the right to participate in interscholastic athletics at the 
transferee high school. The plaintiffs transferred without 
a bona fide change of residence. The transfer rule of the 
high school league called for an automatic declaration of 
ineligibility for a period of one year, regardless of the 
motives prompting the transfer. It was determined that the 
transfer was voluntary and not the result of recruitment for 
athletic purposes. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the rule in 
favor of the high school league. In so moving, the court 
stated (26, p. 819): 
The rule in question does not infringe upon any 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  g u a r a n t e e d  r i g h t  . . . .  
[PJarticipation in [interscholastic athletics] 
is a privilege which may be claimed by students 
only in accordance with the eligibility standards 
prescribed for participation. 
Respondents further charge that the rule is 
arbitrary in its application to them, because 
it was adopted to prevent the recruiting of 
athletes and no provision is made for review 
in individual cases, so as to grant relief 
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from its provisions where, as in this case, 
the transfer is voluntarily made without 
the prohibited element of inducement. 
* * * 
In contending that, since they were not re­
cruited and the rule was designed to prevent 
recruiting, it should not apply to them, 
respondents confuse the reasons which prompted 
the adoption of the rule with the method 
adopted to accomplish the desired goal. Pro­
hibitive administrative difficulties, as well 
as others, resulting from a determination 
in each case of the reason prompting the 
transfer could have properly influenced the 
member schools to decide that the best method 
to accomplish the elimination of the evil of 
recruiting was to bind themselves to adherence 
to a rule without exceptions or qualifications. 
The merits of such a rule or the wisdom of its 
adoption are not for the courts to determine. 
Most court cases reviewed which alleged a denial of due 
process were concluded by the court citing Mitchell (7), 
supra, as the controlling case. Two exceptions to this con­
clusion were noted in the cases of Lee (23), supra, and 
Bryant (24), supra, in the State of Florida in 1974 and 1975, 
respectively. In both cases involving suits against the 
Florida High School Activities Association, Inc., the 
plaintiffs alleged that the actions of the association had 
denied to them the exercise of their right to the due process 
of law. Both plaintiffs had been declared ineligible from 
further athletic participation under the four year eligibility 
rule without being granted due process procedures to present 
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their claims that the ineligibility should be waived in view 
of their hardship cases. 
In ruling in favor of the plaintiffs in both cases, the 
court noted in the case of Lee (23, p. 638), supra, that the 
association had failed to provide an opportunity for the 
plaintiffs to present evidence of an alleged hardship case. 
By refusing to provide due process procedures and reasons for 
the association's actions, the court felt the four year 
eligibility rule had been applied arbitrarily. In so ruling, 
the court stated its position in regard to due process of law 
claims involving actions of an association in this reference 
(23, p. 638): 
We hold that upon complaint of a citizen 
the court has the power and the duty to 
determine whether the citizen has been 
deprived of due process of law by the action 
of an association, such as the FHSÀÀ whose 
conduct of affairs is state action in the 
constitutional sense. 
Regarding the case of Bryant (24, p. 58), supra, in 1975, 
the court stated; 
In our view, the contentions of the appellant 
were answered squarely by this court's holding 
in Lee v, Florida High School Athletic Associa­
tion, Inc., . . 1 291 So 2d 636. 
Further, we do not think the defendant has shown 
that its initial finding that the plaintiff had 
not presented an adequate case of undue hard­
ship vas either fair or supported by competent 
substantial evidence. 
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A class action suit in 1975 was filed on behalf of the 
public school students in Ohio to determine the extent to 
which students were entitled to the constitutional guaranty 
of procedural due process in education. The case, Goss v. 
Lopez (27), was eventually appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. Due to the case pertaining to the due process 
afforded public school students and, subsequently, decided 
in the highest court of the land, the case is presented for 
analysis of the court's reasoning and interpretation of the 
application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Lopez, the plaintiff-appellee, alleged that students had 
been suspended from school for up to ten days without hearing, 
an act which the plaintiff claimed denied students procedural 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant-
appellant, Goss, as principal had been empowered by Ohio 
statute to suspend pupils for misconduct for up to ten days, 
but each suspension required the principal to notify the 
student's parents and state the reasons for the action within 
twenty-four hours of the incident. 
The issue brought before the United States Supreme Court 
was whether the statute deprived the students of the consti­
tutional guaranty of procedural due process. In affirming 
the earlier decision of the United States District Court, the 
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Supreme Court found the Ohio statute as unconstitutional as it 
permitted suspension without notice or hearing, either before 
or after the suspension (27, p. 740). 
In its reasoning, the United States Supreme Court noted 
that the State of Ohio had by law given every citizen from age 
five to twenty-five a free education in addition to requiring 
thirty-two weeks of compulsory attendance within each school 
year. The students, therefore, had a property and liberty 
interest that qualified for protection under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This protection required 
that the right of an education cannot be withdrawn for mis­
conduct without establishing fair procedures for determining 
whether the misconduct occurred and observing minimum pro­
cedures in taking away that right (27, p. 734). 
The court further defined the requirements for due 
process in connection with a student's suspension of ten days 
or less (27, p. 739): (1) Student must be given written or 
oral notice of charges against him; (2) if student denies 
charges, an explanation of evidence the authorities have and 
an opportunity to present his version must be provided; 
(3) generally, notice and hearing should precede; but (4) if 
not feasible, if student's presence endangers persons, property, 
or threatens disruption of academic process and immediate 
removal is necessary, the necessary notice and hearing should 
follow as soon as practicable. 
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Shortly thereafter in 1975, the United States District 
Court of Pennsylvania tried the case of Dallam v. Cumberland 
Valley School District (13), supra, in which the court was 
called upon to decide whether the constitutional protection 
afforded to public school students by the decision in Goss v. 
Lopez (27), supra, also extended to the extracurricular 
activities of interscholastic athletics. In the case at hand, 
a student was automatically barred from interscholastic com­
petition for a period of one year when the student transferred 
from one school district to another without residing in the 
transferee district with a parent or guardian. The basic 
issue argued on behalf of the plaintiff was not the athletic 
association's reasoning behind the rule, but the fact that the 
automatic ineligibility rule acted as an unrebuttable prescrip 
tion in violation of the student's due process rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution (13, p. 359). 
In deciding for the athletic association, the court dis­
tinguished the case at hand from that of Goss v. Lopez (27), 
supra, in this statement (13, p. 361): 
It is significant that in the context of finding 
a property interest in education the majority in 
Goss spoke in terms of a "total exclusion from 
the educational process." ... it seems to us 
that the property interest in education created 
by the state is in participation in the entire 
process. The myriad activities which combine 
to form that educational process cannot be dis­
sected to create hundreds of separate property 
rights, each cognizable under the Constitution. 
Otherwise, removal from a particular class, 
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dismissal from an athletic team, a club or 
any extra-curricular activity, would each 
require ultimate satisfaction of procedural 
due process. 
The court based its decision on the 1970 case of Mitchell 
V .  Louisiana High School Athletic Association (7), supra, and 
quoting from it stated (13, p. 361): 
'[T]he due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not insulate a citizen from 
every injury at the hands of the state. 
'Only those rights, privileges and immunities 
that are secured by the Constitution of the 
United States or some Act of Congress are 
within the protection of the federal courts. 
Rights, privileges and immunities not derived 
from the Federal Constitution or secured 
thereby are left exclusively to the protec­
tion of the states.' The privilege of 
participation in interscholastic athletics 
must be deemed to fall in the latter category 
and outside the protection of due process.' 
As noted in the general discussion of due process, this 
chapter is to be directed toward a presentation of court cases 
involving athletic associations in which the denial of pro­
cedural and substantive due process was the claim. A review 
of those cases presented revealed no cases within which the 
denial of substantive due process was the issue. All cases 
presented, consequently, involved the issue of procedural due 
process. 
The review of court cases, as noted, did not produce one 
case involving an athletic association's alleged denial of 
substantive due process, but in the research conducted, one 
recent case in education did involve such an allegation. The 
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case cited was the 1975 Arkansas case of Wood v. Strickland 
(28) which was eventually reviewed by the United States 
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. The case involved the 
respondent, Strickland, and two other high school girls, who 
had been expelled from school for "spiking" the punch. The 
girls had been placed in charge of the punch for an after 
school home economics party. In the course of events, the 
girls used malt liquor to mix with the punch. Some days after 
the party had concluded, the school administration learned of 
the incident and suspended the girls from school. Upon review 
of the incident by the school board, the girls were found in 
violation of a school policy which prohibited the use or pos­
session of intoxicating beverages at school functions. The 
girls were then expelled by the board. The suit alleging 
that the school district had denied due process to the students 
was initiated. 
The case was first heard by the United States District 
Court which issued a verdict for the school district. From 
this decision, the plaintiffs appealed and the case went to 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed and 
remanded the trial court's decision. Among the reasons for 
the Court of Appeals decision was the court's finding that the 
students substantive due process had been violated by the 
school board in expelling the students on the basis of no 
evidence of a violation having occurred. The court reasoned 
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(28, p. 1001); 
'To justify the suspension, it was necessary 
for the Board to establish that the students 
possessed or used an 'intoxicating' beverage 
at a school-sponsored activity. No evidence 
was presented at either meeting to establish 
the alcoholic content of the liquid brought 
to the campus. Moreover, the Board made no 
finding that the liquid was intoxicating. The 
only evidence as to the nature of the drink 
was that supplied by the girls, and it is 
clear that they did not know whether the 
beverage was intoxicating or not.' 
The Court of Appeals had concluded that the school regu­
lation prohibiting "intoxicating beverages" meant the same as 
the Arkansas statute's definition of "intoxicating liquor" 
which must have an alcoholic content of over five percent by 
weight. Consequently, the malt liquor was shown to have an 
alcoholic content of a little more than three percent, so the 
court reasoned no real evidence had been produced. Therefore, 
substantive due process had been denied the plaintiffs. 
Upon review of the Court of Appeals reasoning by the 
United States Supreme Court, the court found that the con­
clusion reached was based upon an erroneous construction of 
the school regulation in question (28, p. 1001). The Supreme 
Court then reasoned (28, p. 1002); 
Testimony at the trial . . .. established 
convincingly that the term "intoxicating 
beverage" in the school regulation was not 
intended ... to be linked to the definition 
in the state statute ... of "intoxicating." 
... In light of this evidence, the Court of 
Appeals was ill advised to supplant the inter­
pretation of the regulation of those officers 
who adopted it and are entrusted with its 
enforcement. 
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The court established the fact that evidence was present to 
support the charge against the plaintiffs. Therefore, sub­
stantive due process had not been denied to the plaintiffs. 
This case illustrates the meaning and application of sub­
stantive due process, even though the reasoning was finally 
struck down by the Supreme Court. The incidence of denial of 
substantive due process will most likely be infrequent in 
court cases involving education and, particularly, athletic 
issues. This statement is based upon the case just concluded 
and the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case (28, p. 1003) : 
It is not the role of the federal courts to 
set aside decisions of school administrators 
which the courts may view as lacking a basis 
in wisdom or compassion. Public high school 
students do have substantive and procedural 
rights while at school .... But §1983 [part 
of the Civil Rights action for deprivation of 
rights] does not extend the right to relitigate 
in federal court evidentiary questions arising 
in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper 
construction of school regulations. The system 
of public education that has evolved in this 
Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion 
and judgment of school administrators and school 
board members and §1983 was not intended to be 
a vehicle for federal court correction of errors 
in the exercise of that discretion which do not 
rise to the level of violations of specific 
constitutional guarantees. 
Summary 
The common law principles presented in this chapter 
represent the courts' interpretation of the due process clause 
of the United States Constitution as applied in court cases 
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involving interscholastic athletics in the public high school. 
The court cases reviewed for this interpretation occurred from 
1970 into 1976. 
Two legal aspects of due process of law are procedural 
and substantive. The reviewed court cases revealed the claim 
that procedural due process was allegedly denied the plaintiffs. 
However, the denial of substantive due process was not found 
in any athletic cases. The only related case with the alleged 
denial of substantive due process was one in the broader field 
of education, but the United States Supreme Court overturned 
that claim in its review of the case. 
Certain legal principles are noted upon review of the 
cases presented. These legal principles are summarized for 
those officials who have responsibility for the eligibility 
rules of interschclastic competition with public high schools; 
1. Athletic participation has not been regarded 
by the courts as a property; therefore, due 
process does not apply. 
2. Athletic participation is not named as a 
fundamental right or privilege in the United 
States Constitution; therefore, due process 
does not apply. 
3. Procedural due process was found to apply to 
cases involving a general denial of the right 
to an education, but it does not apply to the 
individual programs comprising that education, 
such as athletics. 
4. The denial of substantive due process which 
questions the reasoning and discretion of 
regulations was found to be an area in the 
general field of education into which the 
Supreme Court of the United States would not 
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enter unless specific constitutional 
guarantees were violated. Since no cases 
involving this denial could be found in 
athletics, and since athletics is only an 
individual program within the general field 
of education, it appears remote that any 
future claims of denial of substantive due 
process will be entertained by the courts. 
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CHAPTER V: EQUAL PROTECTION IN ATHLETICS 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the interpreta­
tion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the United States Constitution as it is applied to 
interscholastic athletics in the public high schools. To 
interpret the meaning of the equal protection clause, its 
common law status is reviewed through an analysis of selected 
court cases occurring from 1970 into 1976. 
Equal Protection of the Law 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution had at its origin the primary 
purpose of providing a guaranty to the recently freed Negroes 
that various state and local laws in existence or to be en­
acted were unconstitutional if they denied equal rights and 
treatment to all within a state (29, p. 297). The express 
purpose of the clause was to forbid states from denying equal 
protection of the laws, in the same place and under like 
circumstances and conditions, to all persons subjected to 
state legislation (29, p. 296). 
The equal protection clause written into the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution has bean developed 
through common law to have this meaning (29, p. 296); 
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Equal protection to all is the basic principle 
on which rests justice under the law. ... a 
state may not deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
This clause is a pledge of equal protection of 
laws or protection of equal laws; and it means, 
and is a guaranty, that all persons subjected 
to state legislation shall be treated alike, 
under like circumstances and conditions, both 
in privilege conferred and in liabilities im­
posed; but it guarantees only the protection 
enjoyed by other persons or classes in the same 
place and under like circumstances, in pursuit 
of their lawful occupations; and it is not a 
guaranty of equality of operation or application 
of state legislation on all citizens of a state. 
The equal protection clause is intended to guaranty to 
all persons physically present within a state, regardless of 
station or condition, the equal protection of the laws of that 
state (29, p. 300). Further, the clause is to (29, p. 299): 
. . . secure and safeguard equality of right 
and of treatment against intentional and 
arbitrary discrimination; but it operates 
only on legal rights otherwise created or 
existing and does not itself create any new 
legal rights, except the general right to 
equal protection of the laws. 
Many of the court cases involving a claim against a state 
athletic association or a public school regulation has noted 
in the court record that the court viewed the actions of the 
association or public school as "state action in the strictest 
sense." As such, the equal protection clause is applied to 
the actions of the association or the public school. 
Frequently, the various state athletic associations legis 
late or recommend to the public school boards for adoption 
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certain regulations which involve a classification of the 
persons participating in athletic contests. Since the actions 
of the association or the public school board are state action, 
a challenge to the classification frequently arises contending 
that the classification in question stands as a violation to 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A 
review of American Common Law on the subject of legislative 
classification reveals (29, p. 314): 
Legislative classification which is not palpably 
arbitrary and may reasonably be conceived to rest 
on some real and substantial difference or dis­
tinction bearing a just and fair relation to the 
legislation is not a denial of equal protection 
of the laws. 
The prohibition against denial of equal protec­
tion does not preclude a state or municipality 
from resorting to classification for purposes 
of legislation and confining the legislation to 
a certain class or classes, prescribing different 
sets of rules for different classes, or dis­
criminating in favor of, or against, a certain 
class, provided the classification or discrimina­
tion is reasonable, rather than arbitrary, and 
rests on a real and substantial difference or 
distinction which bears a just and reasonable 
relation to the legislation or the subject or 
object thereof, cind provided also the legisla­
tion operates equally, uniformly, and impartially 
on all persons or property within the same class. 
A classification having some reasonable basis 
does not offend the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it is not made 
with mathematical nicety or scientific exactness, 
or because in practice it certainly results in 
some inequality. Any state of facts which can 
reasonably be conceived to sustain the classifica­
tion will be assumed to have existed at the time 
the law was enacted; and the classification will 
not be interfered with by the courts unless it 
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is clearly, manifestly, palpably, and purely 
arbitrary and unreasonable .... 
The study of the concept of equal protection as applied 
to athletics is presented in the remainder of this chapter. 
Specifically, those court cases which classify student 
participation on the basis of marriage and/or sex in public 
high school athletics are reviewed and presented for study. 
Cases occurring prior to 1970 which were controlling cases as 
well as those occurring after 1970 and into 1976 are reviewed. 
Married Students as a Separate Classification 
Prior to 1970, a precedent setting case which established 
married students as a separate classification in high school 
athletics was tried in 1959 in the Court of Civil Appeals in 
the State of Texas. The case, Kissick v. Garland Independent 
School District (30), involved a sixteen year old male 
student who married while in high school and was, subsequently, 
ruled ineligible from football and barred from further high 
school participation in athletics. The school district con­
tended its decision was based upon a resolution adopted to 
discourage juvenile marriages among high school students. 
Further, the district felt it inappropriate for married 
students to participate in athletics in that separate 
facilities would be needed to accommodate the married students 
which could not be provided. Kissick, {plaintiff-appellant, 
contended that he had planned to continue playing football to 
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qualify for a college scholarship. He alleged that the school 
resolution was discriminatory, unreasonable and unconstitu­
tional. 
The principal issue before the court was the question of 
whether married students could be classified separately from 
other students, thus making possible the establishment of dif­
ferent eligibility rules than exist for nonmarried students. 
The court affirmed the lower court judgment against the appel­
lant. In so ruling, the court upheld the school district 
resolution barring married high school students from extra­
curricular activities. The reasons given by the court in 
support of its decision consisted of the following (30): 
(1) rule did not appear to penalize persons because of mar­
riage; (2) rule was not void on ground that it deprived married 
high school student of equal protection of the law or due 
process of the law; and (3) school did not act in an arbitrary, 
capricious, discriminating, or unreasonable manner. The 
court's perceived role in issues dealing with boards of educa­
tion was expressed in its concluding statement (30, p. 712): 
'Boards of Education, rather than Courts, are 
charged with the important and difficult duty 
of operating the public schools. So, it is 
not a question of whether this or that individual 
judge or court consider a given regulation 
adopted by the Board as expedient. The Court's 
duty, regardless of its personal views, is to 
uphold the Board's regulation unless it is 
generally viewed as being arbitrary and un­
reasonable. Any other policy would result in 
confusion detrimental to the progress and 
efficiency of our public school system.' 
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Through the sixties, Kissick (30), supra, was the ruling 
case in most of the athletic cases involving married students' 
participation. In 1967, the Iowa Supreme Court considered the 
case of the Board of Directors of the Independent School 
District of Waterloo v. Green (31). The plaintiff-appellee. 
Green, a married male high school student, sought to enjoin 
the school board from enforcing its rule excluding all married 
pupils from participation in any extracurricular activities. 
The plaintiff, in not being permitted to continue as a member 
of the basketball team in his senior year, raised the issue 
that the board's rule was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, 
irrational, unauthorized, and unconstitutional. The Iowa 
Supreme Court decided in favor of the school board and 
reversed an earlier trial court decision against the board. 
In supporting its decision, the Supreme Court recognized 
the board's rule as establishing two classes of students in 
the field of extracurricular activities; those married and 
those having not entered into a marital relationship. The 
court did not view the classification of students into the 
two groups as a violation of the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment since the classifications were merely 
a form of differentiation (31, p. 860). The court supported 
its reasoning by citing the case of Starkey v. Board of Educa­
tion of the Davis County School District, 381 P. 2d 718, 
decided in 1963 which stated (31, p. 860): 
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'We have no disagreement with the proposition 
advocated that all students attending school 
should be accorded equal privileges and ad­
vantages. But the participation in extra­
curricular activities must necessarily be 
subject to regulations as to eligibility. 
Engaging in them is a privilege which may be 
claimed only in accordance with the standards 
set up for participation. It is conceded, as 
plaintiff insists, that he has a constitutional 
right both to attend school and to get married. 
But he has no 'right' to compel the Board of 
Education to exercise its discretion to his 
personal advantage so he can participate in 
the named activities.' 
A United States District Court in Texas in 1971 heard the 
case of Romans v. Crenshaw (32). The plaintiff, Romans, a 
married and divorced female high school student, sought to 
enjoin the school district from enforcement of a regulation 
which prevented married or divorced students from participating 
in any extracurricular activities. The basic issue was to 
determine whether the regulation violated the equal protection 
of the law guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The court's decision was to enjoin the 
defendant school district's superintendent, Crenshaw, from 
enforcing the regulation. The court's basis for the decision 
rested in the fact that the case developed no school disci­
plinary reason for the regulation or classification. There­
fore, the court reasoned (32, p. 871); 
Any and all extracurricular activities cannot 
rationally or legally be disassociated from 
school courses proper where they do or may form 
an element in future collegiate eligibility or 
honors as here. Such a practice is not only 
discriminatory on its face, but is fundamentally 
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Inconsistent with the state's promise of a 
public education for its youth upon an equal 
basis. 
In Iowa in 1971, the United States District Court heard 
the case of Rubel v. Iowa Girls High School Athletic Union 
(33), The plaintiff, a female high school student, had pre­
viously been a member of the girls' basketball team, winning 
recognition within the community and state for superior per­
formance. Prior to the 1970 basketball season, the plaintiff 
was lawfully married and in December of that year, gave birth 
to a child. In January of 1971, the plaintiff requested the 
opportunity to be restored to the basketball team based on her 
ability to compete. The school denied her the opportunity to 
participate due to the athletic union's by-laws which declared 
any female student ineligible who was (33, p. 6): (1) asso­
ciated with a marital status; (2) associated with motherhood; 
and/or (3) living with someone other than her parent or 
guardian. The plaintiff renewed her request to participate 
on the girls' basketball team in September of 1971 and again 
was denied. Just prior to the start of practice for the 1971-
72 season, the plaintiff again requested the right to partici­
pate, but was again denied. 
On November 18, 1971 the athletic union repealed the two 
by-laws denying the right of participation to a female who had 
been associated with marriage or motherhood and commenced a 
redraft of the by-law regarding residence to provide for 
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females that marry. To insure that the plaintiff would not be 
denied participation while the by-laws were being redrafted, 
a preliminary injunction was issued on November 22, 1971, to 
restrain enforcement of the by-laws. The plaintiff alleged 
discrimination and denial of due process in her suit. The 
court tried the case and found that the questioned by-laws 
denied the plaintiff equal protection rights under the Iowa 
Constitution. In the memorandum decision, the court issued a 
permanent injunction against enforcement of the by-laws. The 
court reasoned (33, p. 10); 
Students in Iowa's public high schools are a 
class whose constitutional rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment have been expressly 
recognized. 
Classifications based on sex are also subject 
to the requirements and must be reasonable and 
not arbitrary .... No attempt has been made 
to show why females should be treated differ­
ently from males in these activities. Accord­
ingly, the court perceives no reason why the 
[by-laws of IGHSAU] should not be held in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Insofar as these rules created an unnecessary 
public interest and involvement with plaintiff's 
marital status and conjugal relations, they 
caused the state to invade marital privacy 
without rational justification and became 
violative of plaintiff's rights to privacy and 
personal freedom. 
Â United States District Court in Ohio in 1972 heard the 
case of Davis v. Meeks (34), in which the plaintiff, Davis, 
brought suit against the school board president to enjoin the 
district from enforcing a rule which excluded married high 
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school students from extracurricular activities. The specific 
rule challenged permitted married students to attend school 
but prevented them from participating in school sponsored 
extracurricular activities. The plaintiff contended that the 
rule deprived him of a part of the school program due to his 
marriage which is in itself a right and a civil liberty. This 
presented the court with the basic issue of determining 
whether the board's rule violated the constitutional rights of 
the plaintiff. 
In its decision, the court granted a preliminary injunc­
tion against the board's enforcement of the rule. In so 
ruling, the court was of the opinion that the rule was an im­
proper invasion of marital privacy (34, p. 302). However, in 
supporting this decision, the court noted (34, p. 299): 
This problem has been presented a fev; times 
in the past in the state courts, which have 
uniformly held, but often with vigorous 
dissents, that a rule of a board of education 
denying married students the right to 
participate in extracurricular activities 
is valid. 
Also in 1972, a similar suit in Montana was brought before 
the United States District Court. The case was Moran v. School 
District #7 Yellowstone County (35) in which the plaintiff 
sought a preliminary injunction against a rule barring married 
high school students from extracurricular activities. The 
plaintiff was a senior who had been declared ineligible to 
play football due to his marriage. The basic issue to be 
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decided was whether or not the rule had violated the constitu­
tional rights of the plaintiff. 
The court's decision was to grant the preliminary in­
junction sought by the plaintiff. The court felt (35, p. 
1187): 
It is incumbent upon the court to point out 
that the courts have held that marriage alone 
is not a reasonable grounds for expulsion ... ; 
that premarital pregnancy is not a sufficient 
evidence of immorality to justify expulsion, ... ; 
and that unwed mothers may not be excluded from 
public schools unless they are found so lacking 
in moral character that their presence in school 
will taint education of other students .... 
Without evidence of their corrupting influence 
the argument that in the informal atmosphere 
of extracurricular activities married students 
are more likely to have an undesirable influence 
on other students is hardly persuasive. In light 
of the conclusions by the board that association 
will be corrupting must be based upon substantial 
evidence recognizable by the court. 
Again in 1972, in United States District Court in Tennes­
see, a married high school student brought suit against a 
school board's eligibility rule in the case of Holt v. Shelton 
(36). Holt, a married female senior high school student, 
sought a permanent injunction from a rule preventing her from 
participating in any activities at school except, after an 
automatic five day suspension, those activities associated 
with classes in which credit toward graduation is given. The 
plaintiff contended that her rights as secured by the constitu­
tion had been abridged by the school board's rule. 
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The court decided in favor of the plaintiff and granted 
a permanent injunction. In so moving, the court supported 
its decision with these reasons (36, p. 823): 
. . . the regulation . . . infringes upon 
[plaintiff's] fundamental right to marry by 
severely limiting her right to an 
education. . . . the sole purpose of the 
regulation is to discourage, by actually 
punishing, marriages which are perfectly 
legal under the laws of Tennessee and which 
are thus fully consonant with the public 
policy of that state. . . . such a regula­
tion . . . impermissibly infringes upon the 
rights to due process and equal protection 
of the law of those students who come within 
its ambit. 
The United States District Court in Texas tried the case 
of Hollon v. Mathis Independent School District (37) in 1973. 
The plaintiff sought a temporary injunction preventing the 
school district from enforcing a policy which prohibited 
married students from participating in intarscholastic league 
athletic activities. The plaintiff, as a high school senior, 
had married with his parents consent and complied with Texas 
law. The school district had enacted the rule to prevent 
married students from participating in athletics because 
(1) marriages in high school increase the drop-out rate and 
(2) the marriage of one student encourages the marriage of 
other students. The basic consideration before the court, 
therefore, was to decide upon the constitutionality of the 
school board's policy excluding married students from athletic 
participation. 
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The court granted the injunction against the school 
board's enforcement of the policy excluding any married 
student from interscholastic athletic activities. The court 
did so on the basis that the policy was unconstitutional. The 
court supported its decision with this reasoning (37, p. 1270); 
The basis for each of the Federal District 
Court decisions varies slightly, some courts 
finding the denial of equal protection 
inherent in such a policy, other courts 
finding a fundamental invasion of marital 
privacy and the right to an education, or 
finding an unconscionable attempt to punish 
marriages which were both legal and fully 
consistent with the public policy of the 
state, but each decision found exclusionary 
policy from extracurricular activities based 
upon marriage to be unconstitutional. 
. . .  n o  j u s t i f i a b l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  [ e x i s t s ]  
between the marriage of high school athletes 
and the overall drop-out problem; nor does it 
appear that preventing a good athlete, although 
married, from continuing to play in whatever 
game he may excell, would in any way deter 
other marriages or otherwise enhance the drop­
out problem. 
In a similar Texas case in 1974, the Court of Civil 
Appeals tried the case of Bell v. Lone Oak Independent School 
District (38). The plaintiff-appellant. Bell, filed for an 
enjoinment of the school rule which prohibited married 
students from participating in extracurricular activities so 
that he could protect his eligibility to play football. The 
plaintiff-appellant supported his claim with these facts (38, 
p. 637): (1) the school regulation sets up an arbitrary and 
unreasonable classification for married students; (2) the 
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regulation was applied in an arbitrary manner; (3) the regula­
tion infringes on the right to marry; (4) the trial court 
should have applied federal statutes and decision rather than 
state statutes and decision; and (5) he was denied the right 
to participate in school activities paid for out of school 
funds provided under Texas statutes. The case issue was to 
determine the validity of the school regulation banning 
married students from participation in extracurricular activi­
ties. 
The court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff-
appellant, reversing and remanding with direction the earlier 
trial court's decision. The basis for the reversal of 
decision was a finding that the regulation of the school 
district was violative of the equal protection clause. In so 
ruling, the court chose to not follow the common law set forth 
by the 1959 decision rendered in Kissick v. Garland (30), 
supra, (38, p. 638); 
. . . [W]e feel that the rule there should be 
abandoned for one that is non-discriminatory 
and which does not violate constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. 
In 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for Indiana 
set forth a precedent setting decision in the case of the 
Indiana High School Athletic Association v. Raike (39). The 
plaintiff-appellee, Raike, contended that the athletic asso­
ciation's rule barring married high school students from 
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participation in athletics and extracurricular activities was 
a denial of equal protection under the United States Constitu­
tion. The Association contended that the rule was necessary 
to accomplish these objectives (39, p. 70); (1) to allow 
married students time to discharge economic and family 
responsibilities; (2) to discourage teenage marriages so as 
to reduce the high percent of divorce and drop-out rates among 
married students; (3) athletes serve as models or heroes and 
teenage marriages are usually the result of pregnancy so that 
immorality is encouraged if married students are allowed to 
participate; (4) married students cause a double standard to 
be applied; thereby causing discipline, training and admini­
strative problems; and (5) to prevent unwholesome interaction 
between married and nonmarried students in "locker room talk." 
During the time tiie permanent injunction of the trial 
court was in force and the case was being appealed by the 
defendant-appellant to the United States Court of Appeals, 
the plaintiff was participating in athletics as a married 
person. Introduced into the court record were these accom­
plishments involving the plaintiff (39, p. 70); (1) won 
sectional wrestling tournament; (2) elected captain of 
wrestling team; (3) improved batting average in baseball by 
100 points; (4) baseball team record improved from prior year; 
(5) maintained a B average; (6) held a part-time job; and 
(7) discharged family responsibilities. 
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The issue before the court was to determine if the rules 
of the Indiana High School Athletic Association prohibiting 
married high school students from participating in athletics 
and extracurricular activities deny plaintiff the equal pro­
tection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The decision of the court 
affirmed the earlier court decision in favor of the plaintiff. 
The court, in supporting its decision, stated (39, p. 71): 
. . . Rules prohibiting a married high school 
student from participating in athletics and 
extra-curricular activities do not bear a 
fair and substantial relation to the objective 
sought, and therefore deny Raike equal protec­
tion of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
In the record of the court, the court noted that prior to 
1970, the so-called transitional period, courts were reluctant 
to interfere with the propriety of the regulations pro­
hibiting married students from participating in extracurricular 
activities (39, p. 78). The court noted the general feeling 
of the courts by citing this quote from the case of Starkey 
V. Board of Education of the Davis County School District, 
supra, 381 P. 2d 718 (39, p. 78): 
'It is not for the courts to be concerned with 
the wisdom or propriety of a [school board] 
resolution [prohibiting married students from 
participating in extra-curricular activities] 
as to its social desirability, nor whether it 
best serves the objectives of education, nor 
the application to the plaintiff in his par­
ticular circumstances. So long as the resolu­
tion is deemed by the Board of Education to 
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serve the purpose of best promoting the 
objectives of a school, and the standards 
of eligibility are based upon uniformly 
applied classification which bear some 
reasonable relationship to the objectives, 
it cannot be said to be capricious, 
arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory.' 
Since 1970, the court noted the earlier decisions of 
Kissick (30), supra, and Waterloo v. Green (31), supra, to 
have been overruled or abandoned (39, p. 78). The court noted 
the trend since 1970 as support for its decision (39, p. 78); 
The recent trend does support our conclusion 
of unconstitutionality, and in our opinion, 
expresses "the more acceptable view at this 
time" and implies that courts are "beginning 
to develop the conception that school 
children are the intended beneficiaries of 
public education . . . not its prisoners or 
servants." 
* * * 
For the reasons stated the Rules are a consti­
tutionally impermissable classification denying 
Raike equal protection of the laws by excluding 
him from athletic and other extra-curricular 
activities solely because of his marital status. 
Insulating athletic competition from the bale­
ful influence of high school students who may 
or may not have married in haste will not pass 
constitutional muster, because there is no fair 
and substantial relationship between such a 
prohibition and the desired objective of whole-
someness in interscholastic competition. 
Sex as a Basis for a Separate Classification 
A classification by sex that places women in a separate 
category from men simply because of the sex difference is a 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment. A classification distinguishing women from men 
must be based upon some real difference which relates to the 
goals or objectives for the classification. According to 
American Common Law as restated in 16 American Jurisprudence 
§485 (40, p. 899); 
It is settled that the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment operates fully to 
include women within its protective scope. Dis­
criminations against women as such are invalid. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere 
with a distinction based upon sex by creating a 
fictitious equality where there is a real dif­
ference. Classification on the basis of special 
considerations to which women are naturally 
entitled is permissible. 
One of the early court cases of the seventies involving 
a claim of unjustified discrimination against females was pre­
sented in the 1972 case of Reed v. Nebraska School Activities 
Association (41) which was heard before a United States 
District Court. The plaintiff, a female high school student, 
brought suit against the association's regulation which pro­
vided an interscholastic golf and basketball program for boys 
while providing none for girls and prohibiting girls from 
participating with or against boys (41, p. 259). Specifically, 
the plaintiff had attempted to try out for the boys' golf team 
since none existed for girls but was refused because of the 
association's rule against such participation by females. 
The issue before the court was to decide whether or not 
the basis for the rule preventing mixed teams of boys and girls 
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and competition between the sexes was founded upon a classi­
fication which had a reasonable basis. The court decided that 
the classification established by the association's rule 
denied females the equal protection of the laws and granted a 
preliminary injunction against the association's enforcement 
of the rule. The court struck down the defendant's claim that 
the rule was justified due to athletic participation being a 
privilege rather than a right. The court reasoned (41, 
p. 262) : 
The issue is not whether Debbie Reed has a 
"right" to play golf; the issue is whether she 
can be treated differently from boys in an 
activity provided by the state. Her right is 
not the right to play golf. Her right is the 
right to be treated the same as boys unless 
there is a rational basis for her being 
treated differently. 
The court- found no rational basis for the plaintiff being 
treated differently than boys and, consequently, ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
The question of whether sex was the sole basis for a 
separate classification being made in interscholastic high 
school athletics was presented in the 1972 Illinois case of 
Bucha V. Illinois High School Association (9), supra. The 
suit, a class action filed on behalf of other female high 
school students, was directed at three by-laws of the asso­
ciation. Specifically, the three challenged by-lawz stated 
(9, p. 71): (1) member schools could not conduct inter­
scholastic swimming contests for girls; (2) contests between 
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girls could not include organized cheerleading, awards of more 
than one dollar in value, or overnight trips in conjunction 
with contests; and (3) competition between members of the 
opposite sex was prohibited. 
During the course of the suit, the first by-law pro­
hibiting interscholastic swimming contests between girls was 
amended to allow the contests to be conducted. The court 
recognized the plaintiffs as representing the class of all 
girls who may want to compete against boys as members of 
presently all-boy teams and those girls who wish to compete 
in an interscholastic program which is separate from but equal 
to the boys program (9, p. 71). 
The court would not acknowledge the defendant's plea for 
case dismissal on the basis that athletic participation is not 
a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. The court 
concurred in recognizing athletic participation as not being 
guaranteed by the constitution, but instead, took the position 
that the plaintiffs assert the right to equal educational op­
portunity and the right to equal treatment, regardless of sex, 
as guaranteed by the constitution. 
The issue before the court was to determine whether the 
by-laws of the association discriminated against girls in 
denying them equal protection of the law. The decision of the 
court was in favor of the defendants. This decision allowed 
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the continuation of the by-laws which separated competition 
by sex class and established different governing rules appli­
cable to each class. The basis for the court's decision 
rested upon "expert" testimony that distinguished a rationale 
for maintaining separate programs for the sexes. 
Before determining whether the rationale for maintaining 
two separate programs for the sexes was constitutional, the 
court reviewed the United States Supreme Court tests for 
analyzing an alleged denial of equal protection. The two 
tests for analyzing the validity of a regulatory classifica­
tion are known as the rational basis test and the compelling 
state interest test. The rational basis test identifies the 
purposes of a legislative act and then asks whether the chal­
lenged discrimination bears a rational relationship to any of 
those purposes {3, p. 74). The compelling state interest test 
is applied when the classification is grounded on certain 
"suspect" criteria or otherwise infringes upon certain "funda­
mental" rights (9, p. 74). In the case at hand, the court 
ruled out the compelling state interest test because, in the 
case of Reed v. Reed, 92 S.Ct. 251, the court had held that 
sex is not an inherently suspect classification (9, p. 74). 
Therefore.- the court applied the rational basis test and kept 
in mind the statement of Justice Holmes from the case of Quong 
Wing V. Kirkendall, 32 S.Ct. 192 (9, p. 74): 
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. . . • [T]he 14th Amendment does not [create] 
a fictitious equality where there is a real 
difference," .... 
In summary, the court found that a rational relationship 
existed between the actions of the association and the goals 
for interscholastic athletic competition. The court, by its 
decision, did not decide on what is the best program for girls, 
but did declare the existing program for girls as constitu­
tionally permissible (9, p. 75). 
At about the same time a decision was rendered in Bucha 
(9), supra, the Supreme Court of Indiana ruled on an athletic 
association regulation which denied females the right to 
participate or compete with males in noncontact sports. The 
case of Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation (42) 
involved the appellant's challenge to the Indiana High School 
Athletic Association's rule which stated (42, p. 498): 
'Boys and girls shall not be permitted to par­
ticipate in interschool athletic games as 
mixed teams, nor shall boys' teams and girls' 
teams participate against each other in inter­
school athletic contests.' 
The appellant's specific goal was to recognize the right 
of females to participate in noncontact interscholastic ath­
letic competition such as golf, swimming, tennis, track, and 
gymnastics. The appellant conceded that a male-female classi­
fication is reasonable in contests involving physical contact 
(42, p. 498). The main issue before the court was to deter­
mine if the application of the association's rule denied equal 
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protection to female high school students under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
The decision of the Indiana Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the ruling of the Circuit Court and permanently en­
joined the association's rule. The court refused to allow the 
association's rule to (42, p. 500): 
. . . deny female high school students the 
opportunity to qualify for participation with 
male high school students in interscholastic 
athletic contests which do not involve 
physical contact between the participants. 
In support of its decision, the court reasoned (42, p. 498) : 
It is clear that the rule differentiates 
between male and female students. To with­
stand a constitutional challenge the classi-
ficiation "must be reasonable . . . and rest 
upon some ground of difference having a fair 
and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, so that all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike." 
The trial court found that the classification 
was reasonable because of the difference in 
athletic ability between boys and girls. The 
court further reasoned that since the rule 
operates to deny to both classes the oppor­
tunity to compete in "mixed" athletic contests, 
no discrimination results from its application. 
The trial court was careful to observe that the 
rule does not prohibit girls from participating 
in interscholastic athletic contests with other 
girls. 
The evidence introduced at trial indicates 
that neither the appellant's high school nor 
the great majority of high schools throughout 
the state maintain interscholastic athletic 
programs for female students. By denying 
female students the opportunity to participate 
on varsity athletic teams in interscholastic 
competition, the rule, in effect, prohibits 
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females from participating in interscholastic 
athletics altogether. Although the difference 
in athletic ability is a justifiable reason 
for the separation of male and female athletic 
programs, the justification does not exist when 
only one athletic program is provided .... 
It follows that if the rule cannot be justified 
on grounds other than the difference in ath­
letic ability, it must be struck down as vio­
lative of the equal protection clause. 
One of the athletic association's arguments in support of 
the rule centered around the belief that the rule prevented 
boys' from taking positions on girls' teams, thus preserving 
girls' participation in sports. The court's reply to this 
argument was notable, logical, and amusing (42, p. 500): 
It is unnecessary to sound the fire alarm 
until the fire has started. We have not held 
the rule is per se unconstitutional but we are 
here only concerned with its application. Ap­
pellees' argument, which demonstrates admirable 
concern for the welfare of girls' athletic pro­
grams, must fail when one considers that at the 
present time few, if programs are in 
operation which need such protection. Until 
girls' programs comparable to those established 
for boys exist, the rule cannot be justified on 
these grounds. 
In 1973, the case of Ritacco v. Norwin School District 
(43) was heard in United States District Court in Pennsylvania. 
The plaintiff filed suit against a rule of the Pennsylvania 
Interscholastic Athletic Association which established separate 
girls' and boys' teams for interscholastic noncontact sports. 
The suit contended that girls' had a right to participate on 
boys' teams, and that separate teams based on sex was discrim­
inatory. Since the suit was filed after the students' 
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graduation from high school, the court referred the motion for 
the suit to represent a class action. The plaintiff's com­
plaint arose when she was prevented from trying out for the 
boys' tennis team, even though she participated on the girls' 
tennis, gymnastic and swim teams. The issue centered around 
the association rule forbidding mixed teams of boys' and girls' 
in noncontact sports and whether the rule unfairly discriminated 
against females. 
The court found the association rule as not being dis­
criminatory against females and allowed the rule to stand. The 
court noted that no opportunities for girls in sports existed 
prior to 1970, but with the adoption of the rule presently 
being questioned, the participation of girls on interscholastic 
sports teams had mushroomed (43, p. 932). The court further 
reasoned (43, p. 932): 
.  .  .  I T]he maintenance of separate sports 
teams suggests the possibility of a denial 
of equal protection of the laws, but sound 
reason dictates that "separate but equal" 
in the realm of sports competition, unlike 
that of racial discrimination, is justifiable 
and should be allowed to stand where there 
is a rational basis for the rule. . . . Sex, 
unlike race, is not an inherently suspect 
classification. Indeed it seems clear that 
where the opportunities for engaging in 
sports activities are equal, as is true here, 
the rule requiring separate teams based on 
sex fosters greater participation in sports. 
Factors similar to those presented by the plaintiff in 
Haas (42), supra, were responsible for the 1973 Minnesota case 
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of Brenden v. Independent School District (10), supra, ap­
pealed to the Eighth Circuit United States Court of Appeals. 
In the suit, the female plaintiffs-appellees sought an action 
to enjoin the Minnesota State High School League's enforcement 
of a rule which barred females from participation with males 
in the noncontact sports of tennis, cross-country skiing and 
running. In addition to being denied participation on the 
male teams, no alternate teams for females were provided. The 
United States District Court had ruled that the league rule 
was unreasonable, but the league appealed the decision. The 
issue to be decided by the Court of Appeals regarded the 
application of the rule and whether it was arbitrary, un­
reasonable and in violation of the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (10). 
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of 
Appeals ruled (10, p. 1294): 
. . . [Plaintiffs-appellees] are being pre­
vented from participating on the boys' inter-
scholastic teams in tennis, cross-country, 
and cross-country skiing solely on the basis 
of the fact of sex and sex alone. 
The court, in having rendered a decision, stated for the 
record that the ruling did not decide (10, p. 1295): 
First, because neither high school provided 
teams for females in the sports in which 
[plaintiffs-appellees] desired to participate, 
we are not faced with the question of whether 
the school can fulfill their responsibilities 
under the Equal Protection Clause by providing 
separate but equal facilities for females in 
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interscholastic athletics .... Second, 
because the sports in question are clearly 
noncontact sports, we need not determine if 
the High School League would be justified in 
precluding females from competing with males 
in contact sports such as football. 
In the 1973 class action case of Morris v. Michigan State 
Board of Education (44), the Sixth Circuit United States Court 
of Appeals heard the allegation of sex discrimination against 
the Michigan High School Athletic Association rule which 
stated (44, p. 1208) : 
Girls are not to engage in interscholastic 
athletic contests when part or all of the 
membership of one or both of the competing 
teams is composed of boys. 
The suit arose when two high school girls attempted to partici­
pate in interscholastic tennis, were denied, and brought the 
issue before the United States District Court as a denial of 
equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The trial court entered a 
preliminary injunction invalidating the association's rule and 
enjoining the association from (44, p. 1208); 
'Preventing or obstructing in any way in­
dividual plaintiffs or any other girls in the 
State of Michigan from participating fully in 
varsity interscholastic athletics and athletic 
contests because of their sex.' 
In reviewing the case on appeal, the Court of Appeals 
noted that the Michigan Legislature had enacted a statute 
which, when effective, would permit female student participa­
tion in certain noncontact interscholastic athletic contests. 
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The statute stated (44, p. 1209): 
Female pupils shall be permitted to participate 
in all noncontact interscholastic athletic 
activities, including but not limited to archery, 
badminton, bowling, fencing, golf, gymnastics, 
riflery, shuffleboard, skiing, swimming, diving, 
table tennis, track and field and tennis. Even 
if the institution does have a girls' team in 
any noncontact interscholastic athletic activity, 
the female shall be permitted to compete for a 
position on the boys' team. Nothing in this sub­
section shall be construed to prevent or inter­
fere with the selection of competing teams solely 
on the basis of athletic ability. 
Since the new statute was not to become effective during the 
duration of the case, the Court of Appeals, acting on the 
record of the lower court, affirmed the District Court's pre­
liminary injunction but modified the injunction by inserting 
the word "noncontact" between the words "interscholastic" and 
"athletics" (44, p. 1209). 
The 1974 United States District Court case o£ Gilpin v. 
Kansas State High School Activities Association, Inc., (11) 
supra, involved a claim of deprivation of equal protection of 
the law under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The plaintiff, a 
female high school student, was prevented from participating 
on the boys' cross-country team solely on the basis of her sex. 
The high school which the plaintiff attended encouraged and 
permitted mixed competition in certain noncontact sports. The 
plaintiff had met the criteria for participation, but just 
before the team's first meet, the high school administration 
had to prevent her participation due to a state association's 
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rule which stated (11, p. 1236): 
'Boys and girls shall not be members of the 
same athletic teams in interscholastic contests.' 
The school was forced to abide by the rule because it feared 
a violation of the association rule would result in a sanction 
against the entire athletic program. The issue required the 
court to determine whether the alleged violation of the plain­
tiff's equal protection of the law had occurred. 
The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining 
the association from interfering with the plaintiff's partici­
pation on the boys' cross-country team until a hearing could 
be held on her claim. As a result of that hearing, the court 
found the rule preventing mixed competition as unconstitutional 
as applied to this plaintiff. The court stated (11, p. 1243): 
Accordingly, [the plaintiff is] permitted 
to compete on the boys' cross-country 
team . . . during the remainder of the 
current school year . . . . [T]he Kansas 
State High School Activities Association 
is enjoined from imposing any sanction or 
penalty upon [the plaintiff's high school] 
for complying with this Court's order, and 
it is similarly enjoined from imposing any 
sanction or penalty upon any other high 
school for engaging in interscholastic 
competition with [the plaintiff's high 
school]. 
The court, in determining that the plaintiff's constitu­
tional rights had been violated, deterred from the traditional 
rational basis test for determining whether the classification 
by sex met constitutional standards. Instead, the court 
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invoked the "compelling state interest" test and treated the 
classification by sex as a suspect classification. In so doing, 
the court was guided by the following reasoning (11, p. 1239) : 
Although it has consistently been held that 
classifications based upon race, . . . alienage, 
. . . and national origin, . . . are inherently 
suspect and must be subjected to close judicial 
scrutiny, it was not until the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, . . . 
93 S.Ct. 1764 . . 1 , that sex was addedto the 
list of suspect classifications. 
* * * 
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Frontiero, and regardless of the particular 
semantic label attached to the test to be 
applied in sex-oriented cases, there can no 
longer be any doubt but that sex-biased 
classifications are subject to close scrutiny 
by the courts under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
A note regarding the United States Supreme Court's inter­
pretation of Frontiero, supra, should be made at this point. 
The Supreme Court's decision was a plurality decision and as 
such, did not firmly establish sex as a suspect classification 
(11, p. 1239). Of the nine members of the court; (1) four 
elevated sex to the "suspect" status; (2) three members did 
not elevate sex to the "suspect" classification, although con­
curring in the result; (3) one member referred to sex as 
^invidious discrimination," but concurred in the result; and 
(4) one member dissented (45, p. 548). 
Although the decision in the Frontiero, supra, case was 
8 to 1 for the petitioner, the traditional rational basis test 
90 
for determining whether a sex classification meets constitu­
tional standards still stands. However, the court in Gilpin 
(11, p. 1239), supra, was persuaded by the reasoning of the 
opinion. 
The Court in Gilpin (11, p. 1236) further felt that the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in the prior case of Reed v. Reed, 
supra, 92 S.Ct. 253, had required a more stringent test than 
the rational basis test to justify sex classifications by 
noting Chief Justice Burger's quote from the case: 
'[T]his Court has consistently recognized 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny 
to States the power to treat different 
c l a s s e s  o f  p e r s o n s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  w a y s  . . . .  
The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment 
does, however, deny to States the power to 
legislate that different treatment be 
accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria 
wholly unrelated to the objective of that 
statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, 
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair ana substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation, so 
that all persons similarly circumstanced sh'all 
be treated alike.' 
The court did acknowledge and agree with the association's 
stated objective for the development of a girls' inter­
scholastic athletic program. Furthermore, the court agreed 
with the separation of male and female interscholastic competi­
tion, once separate and substantially equivalent programs for 
males and females were, in fact, in existence (11, p. 1240). 
The State of Pennsylvania in 1975 filed suit in the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania against the state athletic 
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association in the case of Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Inter-
scholastic Athletic Association (46). The Attorney General for 
Pennsylvania filed a complaint against the athletic association 
challenging the association's by-law which stated (46, p. 840): 
'Girls shall not compete or practice against 
boys in any athletic contest.' 
The State's claim was that the by-law violates both the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal 
Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution by denying 
females the same opportunities afforded males to practice and 
compete in interscholastic sports (46, p. 841). The complaint 
specifically exempted football and wrestling from the suit. 
In rendering a decision for the State, the court acknowl­
edged that the athletic association's by-law was unconstitu­
tional in view of the Equal Rights Amendment by stating (46, 
p. 841); 
. . . [N]one of the justifications for [the 
By-Law] . . . , even if proved, could sustain 
its legality. We need not, therefore, consider 
whether or not the By-Law also violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The court maintained that the adoption of the Equal Rights 
Amendment in Pennsylvania had caused the courts to reject pre­
vious statutes and case law principles which discriminated 
against either sex. An example of the change that the Equal 
Rights Amendment had brought about was noted by the court in 
the 1974 case of Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, in which (46, 
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p. 841); 
. . . IT]he court cast aside the presumption 
which had previously existed to the effect 
that the father, because of his sex, must 
accept the principal burden of financial 
support of minor children. The court there 
indicated that support is the equal respon­
sibility of both parents and that, in light 
of the [Equal Rights Amendment], the courts 
must now consider the property, income, and 
earning capacity of both in order to determine 
their respective obligations. 
The athletic association contended in its suit that ath­
letic participation was a privilege and not a right, but to 
this the court replied (46, p. 842): 
There is no fundamental right to engage in 
interscholastic sports, but once the state 
decides to permit such participation, it must 
do so on a basis which does not discriminate 
in violation of [its own constitution which 
includes the newly adopted Equal Rights 
Amendment]. 
The second justification advanced by the association for 
the separation of girls and boys in athletic contests was that 
boys generally possess a higher degree of athletic ability 
than girls. Therefore, girls have a greater opportunity to 
participate if they compete with members of their own sex. 
The court did not agree with this rationale in two respects 
(46, p. 842): 
[First], this attempted justification can 
obviously have no validity with respect to 
those sports for which only one team exists 
in a school and that team's membership is 
limited exclusively to boys .... [Secondly], 
even where separate teams are offered for boys 
and girls in the same sport, the most talented 
girls still may be denied the right to play at 
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that level of competition which their ability 
might otherwise permit them. For a girl in 
that position, who has been relegated to the 
"girls' team," solely because of her sex, 
"equality under the law" has been denied. 
Due to the Equal Rights Amendment, girls cannot as a 
group be denied participation on the basis of a general 
characteristic that is said to be more true with their sex 
than with boys. The amendment requires that each girl be 
individually evaluated in terms of her qualifications for 
participation in a particular sport. Exclusion of a girl from 
competition may be made on the basis of her individual quali­
fications, but not on the basis of her sex alone. 
The court ordered, as a result of this trial, that the 
association permit the participation of boys and girls in 
practice and competition in interscholastic athletics beginning 
with the 1975 school year. Even though the State had wanted 
to exempt football and wrestling from the suit, the court saw 
no apparent reason to do so. The order, in effect, made mixed 
competition the rule rather than the exception. 
A case involving an athletic association's rule against 
mixed teams, when a team in the same sport was provided to each 
sex, was at issue in the Court of Appeals for Indiana in 1975. 
The case, Ruman v. Eskew (47). involved the plaintiff-appellant 
Ruman, a female high school student who attempted to partici­
pate on the boys' tennis team even though a girls' team in 
tennis existed. The athletic association's rule provided for 
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girls' participation on boys' teams when a school did not 
provide a team for girls, but if a team for girls in the sport 
existed, eligibility for girls was limited to the girls' team. 
The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against enforce­
ment of the rule, but the trial court refused. On appeal of 
the case to the Court of Appeals, the court also refused the 
request. 
The Court of Appeals made its decision based on two con­
siderations: (1) the reasonableness of the sex classification, 
and (2) the rule's constitutional basis. As authority for the 
decision, the court referred to the Indiana Supreme Court case 
of Haas (42), supra. In that case, the athletic association's 
rule, excluding boy and girl participation on a mixed team, 
was declared unconstitutional for denying equal protection 
rights to females. The bââiâ for the decision resided in the 
fact that girls were not provided a separate team. From the 
case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that a classification by 
sex was reasonable in athletics. Since the case at bar 
represented a school which did operate a girls' tennis pro­
gram, then the plaintiff was given the same opportunity as 
boys' in tennis; therefore, the association's rule was not 
violative of the equal protection of the law. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in 1975 heard the case of 
Darrin v. Gould (48). The plaintiffs-appellants, Darrin, were 
two sisters attending high school who had been prevented from 
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participating on the high school football team by a rule of 
the Washington Interscholastic Athletic Association. The 
association's rule expressly prohibited girls from partici­
pating on the boys' interscholastic contact football team. 
Prior to filing the class action suit to contest the regulation, 
the two girls had met all the requirements for football partici­
pation, practiced with the team, and would have participated 
in the first football contest of the season if the athletic 
association's regulation had not prevented it. The issue re­
quired the court to determine if the classification was based 
on sex per se or em inability to play contact football; and if 
the finding was the former, was it prohibited by constitutional 
and/or statutory law (48, p. 884)? The trial court ruled in 
favor of the defendant, but on appeal to the Supreme Court, 
the court reversed the decision of the trial court in finding 
for the plaintiff and girls like them who wish to participate 
in contact football. 
The reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court paralleled 
the reasoning of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in the 
case of Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic 
Association (46), supra, which the court referred to frequently 
in its décision. Basically, the court could find no other 
basis than sex per se as the reason for denying the girls' 
participation in football. It did note that the lack of a 
corresponding girls' football team made the discrimination on 
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account of sex even more notable. Like the facts presented 
in the Pennsylvania case noted above, the newly adopted Equal 
Rights Amendment figured prominently in the decision as this 
quotation from the court's record indicates (48, p. 893); 
In sum, the [athletic association's] rule 
discriminating against girls on account of 
their sex violates Const, art. 31 [Equal 
Rights Amendment], if not the Equal Protec­
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 
No compelling state interest requires a holding 
to the contrary. The overriding compelling 
state interest as adopted by the people of this 
state in 1972 is that: "Equality of rights and 
responsibility under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged on account of sex." ... We 
agree with the rationale of Commonwealth v. 
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 
supra, that under our ERA discrimination on 
account of sex is forbidden. . . . 
The importance of the Equal Rights Amendment to this 
decision and its possible application to similar cases in the 
future was presented in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Hamilton (48, p. 893); 
With some qualms I concur in the result reached 
by the majority. I do so, however, exclusively 
upon the basis that the result is dictated by 
the broad and mandatory language of . . . Wash­
ington's Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Whether 
the people in enacting the ERA fully contemplated 
and appreciated the result here reached, coupled 
with its prospective variations, may be question­
able. Nevertheless, in sweeping language they 
embedded the principle of the ERA in our 
constitution, and it is beyond the authority of 
this court to modify the people's will. So be it. 
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Summary 
The contents of this chapter present the common law 
principles relating to classifications by sex and by marriage 
of students in public high school athletics. The common law 
principles were drawn from leading cases prior to 1970 and 
occurring into 1976. The main allegation against the classi­
fications by sex and by marriage of students in athletics was 
that the classifications denied the plaintiffs the equal 
protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the United States Constitution. There appears to be 
a trend toward application of the Equal Rights Amendment to 
the classification of females in athletics. 
A review of the court cases presented within this chapter 
highlight certain legal principles relating to the validity of 
the classifications of females and married students in public 
high school athletics. These legal principles are presented 
in summary to aid those officials and representatives of 
athletic associations who are responsible for the rules 
governing participation of high school students in the public 
schools. 
1. High school students have a fundamental right 
to marry and any classification of married 
students, denying to them the opportunities 
afforded other high school students, is an 
invasion of marital privacy and a violation of 
the equal protection of the law guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution. 
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2. The Equal Rights Amendment, once adopted in a 
state's constitution or if it becomes law in 
all states by ratification in thirty-eight states, 
appears to eliminate all sex-based classifications 
and to establish êin athlete's ability as the only 
basis for different treatment. 
3. Where the Equal Rights Amendment has not been 
applied to court cases involving classifications 
by sex in athletics, separate teams for girls and 
boys in noncontact sports have generally been 
upheld provided both sexes have been offered the 
opportunity to participate separately. 
4. When the Equal Rights Amendment has not been a 
factor, the courts have generally ordered mixed 
teams of boys and girls in noncontact sports where 
separate teams were not provided to the girls. 
5. The courts have generally separated boys and 
girls in contact sports even when no separate 
team for girls was provided in the sport. 
6. In states where the Equal Rights Amendment has 
been applied, the courts have ordered the athletic 
associations to permit girls to participate with 
boys in all sports, both contact and noncontact, 
even where separate teams for girls and boys have 
been provided in the same sport= 
7. Generally, classification by sex is permitted in 
athletics, provided the classification has a 
rational basis and is not based upon sex per se. 
Again, the Equal Rights Amendment appears to place 
sex classifications in the "suspect" category 
where no rationale can sustain it. 
8. If the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, future 
court cases involving the question of a classifica­
tion by sex in athletics will most likely be settled 
by the language of the Equal Rights Amendment rather 
than the application of the equal protection clause 
of the United States Constitution. 
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CHAPTER VI; SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Need for the Study 
Since 1970, the courts have had a greater tendency to 
apply constitutional guarantees to those court cases involving 
challenges to state athletic association eligibility regula­
tions. Therefore, this study was intended to inform officials 
of state athletic associations and public schools regarding 
the status of current common law principles affecting the 
enforcement and substance of athletic eligibility rules and 
policies. The information provided should assist these offi­
cials in the revision of existing regulations and the creation 
of new rules and policies to regulate public high school ath­
letic participation. 
Statement of the Problem 
Many student eligibility issues have arisen over the past 
several years as a result of the enforcement of state athletic 
association regulations. Since many of these issues were 
decided by the courts, certain legal principles tended to 
emerge which have affected present and will likely affect 
future athletic eligibility regulations. The problem was, 
therefore, to determine; 
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1. Whether athletic participation in a public school 
is a right or a privilege of students. 
2. The legality of state athletic associations to 
establish eligibility requirements for student 
participation. 
3. The status of state athletic associations' policies 
which classify student participation on the basis 
of marriage and/or sex. 
4. How the intent of the due process clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States can be applied within the .vales 
and regulations of the state athletic associations. 
5. How the intent of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu­
tion can be applied within the rules and regulations 
of the state athletic associations. 
Procedures and Techniques Used in the Study 
Legal data referred to in this study were almost entirely 
primary sources. These data were drawn from; (1) the American 
Digest System and its Descriptive Word Index; (2) the National 
Reporter System; (3) the American Law Reports; (4) the Shepard 
Citation to Court Cases; (5) the Corpus Juris Secundum; and 
(6) the American Jurisprudence. The decisions from state and 
federal courts were reviewed by using the National Reporter 
System. Court cases from the National Reporter System were 
briefed by securing four major sources of information from each 
case: (1) essential facts; (2) major issue(s); (3) decision, 
and (4) reasons supporting the decision. The case briefs were 
presented in narrative form and analyzed for the legal 
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principles they presented. These findings were organized into 
chapters which included: (1) athletic participation; 
(2) athletic eligibility; (3) due process in athletics; 
(4) equal protection in athletics; and (5) summary and recom­
mendations. Each chapter was divided into sub-topics. This 
chapter contains the summary and recommendations. 
Limitations 
This study analyzed those court cases dealing with student 
athletic eligibility in public schools. The reader should be 
reminded, therefore, that the application of the findings of 
this study does not include the athletic eligibility of 
students in private schools or parochial schools. 
The review of legal principles presented in this study is 
a general review of court cases in the United States, In order 
to apply these principles within a specific state, the state's 
constitution and legislative statutes applicable to student 
eligibility in public school athletics would need to be re­
viewed. 
Since 1970, the application of constitutional guarantees 
has been increasingly applied to the athletic eligibility of 
students in the public high school. If this trend continues, 
the legal principles presented by the cases in this study very 
possibly will be further modified. Thus, persons interested 
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in remaining current must be constantly alert to changes as 
court decisions are rendered. 
Summary 
A brief summary of the legal principles originating from 
the court cases reviewed in each chapter will be presented. 
Each chapter will be represented as a sub-topic. The sequence 
of presentation is in the same order as chapter arrangements. 
Athletic participation 
The question of whether athletic participation is a 
property right or a privilege guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution was analyzed by a study of court cases pertaining 
to the subject. Subsequent to this analysis, the following 
legal principles were acknowledged; 
1. Students in public high schools do not have 
an inherent right to participate in inter-
scholastic athletics. 
2. Students within public high schools do not 
have a vested property right in interscholastic 
athletics. 
3. Student participation in interscholastic 
athletics is a privilege falling outside 
the protection of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
4. The legal principle that participation in 
interscholastic competition is a privilege 
rather than a right cannot be provided as 
a basis for excluding females from male 
noncontact sports when no provision allows 
noncontact sports for females. To do 
otherwise is a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Athletic eligibility 
Litigation challenging the enforcement of state athletic 
associations' eligibility rules was investigated. The litiga­
tion revealed many different reasons and strategies used in 
challenges to the associations' eligibility rules. From a 
survey of this litigation, certain legal principles were 
developed which may be applied to future eligibility cases. 
These legal principles appear to be as follows: 
1. Reflecting a state interest, a state athletic 
association is recognized in common law as 
having the authority to set rules and regula­
tions for the supervision and control of the 
public school athletic programs within a state. 
2. The court will not interfere with the discre­
tion exhibited by an association, unless the 
rule or actions of the association are shown 
to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. 
3. The court will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the association, but it will review 
the proceeding to establish whether or not the 
association followed its own guidelines for 
determining ineligibility. 
4. The court will review the proceeding followed 
by an association to determine if any events 
within the proceeding were in violation of 
the due process clause of the Constitution of 
the United States. 
5. The court will review the application of an 
eligibility rule to determine whether its 
basis is in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution= 
6. Student participation in extracurricular activities 
is deemed a privilege and, therefore, such partici­
pation must be in accordance with the established 
standards of the association. 
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Due process in athletics 
Over the past few years, the attempt to apply the due 
process clause of the United States Constitution to state ath­
letic associations' enforcement of eligibility rules has in­
creased. Although due process is considered in two aspects, 
procedural and substantive, the procedural aspect was found to 
be applied to most litigation. A denial of substantive due 
process was not alleged in any of the athletic cases researched. 
After reviewing those court cases against state athletic 
associations alleging a denial of due process, these legal 
principles tended to appear : 
1. Athletic participation has not been regarded by 
the courts as a property; therefore, due 
process does not apply. 
2. Athletic participation is not named as a funda­
mental right or privilege in the United States 
Constitution; therefore, due process does not 
apply. 
3. Procedural due process was found to apply to 
cases involving a general denial of the right 
to an education, but it does not apply to the 
individual programs comprising that education, 
such as athletics. 
4. The denial of substantive due process which 
questions the reasoning and discretion of regula­
tions was found to be an area in the general 
field of education into which the Supreme Court 
of the United States would not enter unless 
specific constitutional guarantees were violated. 
Since no cases involving this denial could be 
found in athletics, and since athletics is only 
an individual program within the general field 
of education, it appears remote that any future 
claims of denial of substantive due process will 
be entertained by the courts. 
105 
Equal protection in athletics 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution has increasingly been 
applied to eligibility rule decisions of the state athletic 
associations. These challenges to the eligibility decisions 
of athletic associations have been made most frequently where 
the eligibility rules enforce separate classifications of 
students. Those classifications which were challenged most 
frequently, and which were the subject of this review, 
separated females from males and married students from un­
married students in high school athletic participation. A 
review of those court cases involving a challenge to the eligi­
bility rules which established these classifications revealed 
these legal principles: 
1. High school students have a fundamental right 
to marry and any classification of married 
students, denying to them the opportunities 
afforded other high school students, is an in­
vasion of marital privacy and a violation of the 
equal protection of the law guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution. 
2. The Equal Rights Amendment, once adopted in a 
state's constitution or if it becomes law in 
all states by ratification in thirty-eight 
states, appears to eliminate all ses-basad 
classifications and to establish an athlete's 
ability as the only basis for different 
treatment. 
3. Where the Equal Rights Amendment has not been 
applied to court cases involving classifications 
by sex in athletics, separate teams for girls 
and boys in noncontact sports have generally 
been upheld provided both sexes have been offered 
the opportunity to participate separately. 
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4. When the Equal Rights Amendment has not been 
a factor, the courts have generally ordered 
mixed teams of boys and girls in noncontact 
sports where separate teams were not provided 
to the girls. 
5. The courts have generally separated boys and 
girls in contact sports even when no separate 
team for girls was provided in the sport. 
6. In states where the Equal Rights Amendment has 
been applied, the courts have ordered the 
athletic associations to permit girls to 
participate with boys in all sports, both 
contact and noncontact, even where separate 
teams for girls and boys have been provided 
in the same sport. 
7. Generally, classification by sex is permitted 
in athletics, provided the classification has 
a rational basis and is not based upon sex 
per se. Again, the Equal Rights Amendment 
appears to place sex classifications in the 
"suspect" category where no rationale can 
sustain it. 
8. If the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, 
future court cases involving the question of 
a classification by sex in athletics will 
most likely be settled by the language of 
the Equal Rights Amendment rather than the 
application of the equal protection clause 
of the United States Constitution. 
Recommendations 
These recommendations are presented in view of the 
findings provided by the analysis of court cases reviewed. 
Those officials concerned with the formulation and enactment 
of present and future policies of eligibility for public school 
athletics should find these recommendations beneficial. The 
following recommendations are presented for consideration; 
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Even though athletic participation has been 
ruled by the courts as a privilege rather than 
a right, this fact should not be used by the 
association as a rationale in response to 
every claim made against their eligibility 
rules. Instead, it should be the basis upon 
which athletic associations bind those who 
choose to participate to the observance of 
the eligibility rules for participation. 
Eligibility rules should be constructed so as 
to reflect reasonable objectives. The objectives 
for the eligibility rule(s) should also be in 
print, perhaps in the form of a brief preamble 
to each rule. 
State athletic association rules should become 
local school district rules either through 
legislative statute or through local school 
board adoption. 
The eligibility standards of a state athletic 
association should be based upon valid considera­
tions, but the standards should not be so definite 
and final to exclude consideration of an individual 
participant's particular circumstances. 
Provisions should be made at the local level for 
the student facing ineligibility to have the 
opportunity for a spokesman or representative to 
present information in his behalf before a final 
decision is made. 
Provisions should be made at the local level for 
a person to be designated hearing officer for the 
purpose of hearing and ruling on appealed 
ineligibility cases. 
Although state courts have varied in their 
rulings, the state athletic associations should 
establish uniform standards and appeal procedures 
for hearing or receiving evidence regarding 
individual participants who have been declared 
ineligible, but who further seek an opportunity to 
establish reasons for their eligibility. 
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8. Every decision related to an alleged violation of 
eligibility should go to the parent and student in 
writing, noting: (1) the specific eligibility rule 
allegedly violated; (2) the date and reason the 
alleged violation of eligibility occurred; (3) the 
reason for the eligibility rule; (4) the date, time, 
and place the appointed official(s) met with the 
parent and student and reviewed information regarding 
the alleged violation of eligibility; and (5) the 
decision of the appointed official(s). 
9. No separate classifications for married and un­
married students should exist for participation 
in public high school athletics. 
10. No separate classifications for boys and girls in 
noncontact sports should exist unless both classifica­
tions have the same opportunities to complete 
separately. 
11. Mixed teams of boys and girls in noncontact 
sports should be initiated where separate teams 
for each cannot be provided. 
12. The separation of boys and girls in contact 
sports can be substantiated on the basis of 
reviewed court decisions. 
13. In those states having enacted the Equal Rights 
Amendment into their state constitutions, no 
rationale can sustain the recommendations con­
tained in 10, 11 and 12. State associations in 
these states must eliminate all classifications 
having any relationship to sex and provide 
participation in contact and noncontact sports 
on the basis only of ability to compete. 
14. If the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified by three-
fourths of the states, the Amendment becomes a part 
of the United States Constitution superseding all 
state laws and regulations. Therefore, each state 
athletic association not now affected by the Equal 
Rights Amendment in the state constitution should 
explore plans for athletic participation founded on 
the basis of participation by ability alone. The 
recommendations numbered 10, 11 and 12 would then 
not apply. All competition would be mixed in both 
noncontact and contact sports with participation 
based on the sole criterion of ability. 
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